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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTIOR 
'l'be relative abundance of vater in moet paTU of Ghana hu been a 
buic factoT in ahapina our pattel'119 of vater ua•. Water hu been tradi-
tioaally free for the taktna. Only in the ••i·arid regiou have practice• 
evolved from a concept of 1carcity. In addition to the abundance of free-
da. to capture, water ia uaually cheap to tranaport and handle . 'Iba con-
aequence of th••• and other factor• have led to pattern• of water uaea 
vbich are very a•neroua and ,.rhapa vaateful in moat part• of the country. 
It ie undoubtedly true that people of the ••i-arid area• of the 
Northern le&lon and the Accra Plaine in the aouthern part of the country 
appreciate the value of water aore than any other region. Certainly to 
any obeerver in the•• area• (eapecially in the Accra Plaine), the line 
vbich div id•• rich lmd from vut• land ie a water line. The by to the 
prHent and future developMnt of the•• area• ie water. Even in tb.e water 
abundant areaa, u water g:rowe relatively ec.arce vlth reepect to the faat-
lncreutAa d ... nct, change• will be required in water uae practice• in 
Chana. Public welfare in aany area• aay require a more reetrictive uae 
of water for all purpo9••· 
l'be Volta liver Project 
The Volta, Ghana'• ujor river, ie about 1,000 ail•• lona. It begiu 
aa the Black Volta in a range of bUla veat of Bobo Dioulueo in Upper 
Volta . From there it flova acme 200 ail•• in a northveet direct.ion, bend• 
eoutbaut to form the upper bowidary line between Ghana and the Ivory 
Coaat, thence •and•ring down to the Gulf of Guinea and into the Atlantic 
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Ocean. 
On ita way to the •••-·through •pare• •crub tree and aru•y aavanna 
of northern Ghana, the rain forut reaf.on of th• aouth and tba aanarov• 
zone of the cout••the river ia joined by the watere of the Red Volta,. 
White Volta, the Afram, Oti and •inor tributarlea. The total catc1-11t 
area of the Volta River Buin cover• aome 152,000 square au .. and extena 
into thr•• cO'Ulltrt.ea adjointna Ghana (aee Pf.lure 1). 
Thie wu the courae of the Volta lllver for centurle• before Ako•ambo 
n.. vu c009tructed at a 1ite where the river narrow• between conversing 
hill.a about 60 ail•• from the coaat. Now, along a 2SO-aile stretch of 
the riwr channel north of Akoaaabo, the d-4 up vatere have rf.Hn and 
apread out to fora Lake Volta. 
Creation of Lake Volta, in area the largest man-made lake in th• 
* world, baa brought about both prob181U and opportunitie1. About 80,000 
peraou lived in the area inundated by the lab. Th\UI, apart from the 
naceeaity of apenclina a large amount of money for reaettl ... nt, there 
w .. the humm attachment to familiar place• forever 108t from eight. 
To eue the move, the Governmnt of Ghana and the Volta B.iver Authority 
(a 1tatutory corporatioa owned by the Republic of Ghana) pla.maed and 
built entire new comn.miti•• on higher ground. Nev farm have been 
eatablitbed and mw roada coutructed. It 18 hoped that the potential 
benefit• of the lake (principally, cheap bydro-•l•ctric ponr, irriaa· 
ti.on, domeatic, and ind\Ultrial water, flood control, low co•t water 
* Areas 3,27.5 1quare 1111••· Lenaths 250 ail••· Capacity: 
120,000,000 acre feet. Shorelf.ne: 4,500 11ila1. 
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traaaportatlon) will 110re than cC11pen•ate for th• probl ... of reaettl ... nt. 
At.oat all th• previoua water project• ver-e atngle•purpoae ln concept; 
alid irrigation wu the only recopized payf.na water eratity. ~ Volta 
l.iwr Project ho broupt about a ahift to the mult1-purpoee concept. Tb• 
project almult~oualy allova the con1truction of paver-aeneratiD& facil• 
itie• and the aale of power (the aingle ll08t i!lportmt product of the pro-
ject) to help ffnance the uaociated irrf.aation acheau. 
Generally. today'• aulti•purpoae water project• ..,. include a combiil.a· 
tion of the follawf.na function•: lrrf.&ation, power, smmicipal uae• (for 
do•Httc. induatrial and public purpo•e•), recreation, flood coatrol, 
pollution control, fiah and wildlife, and int.ad water tran.portation 
(nnf.aation). BOW9Ver, only a fw of the•• water uH• will attract the 
water• of Lake Volta. There ta, therefore, the need for a judicioua and 
efft.clent allocation of the 8dd1t1onal water of al>out 120 a1111oa acre· 
feet (which Lab Volta will provUe) between the 1110et pre••ina water ••• 
in Chana now. 
Oa a&Dy of the older project• 11Ulti•purpoae benefit• ta... been 
occurriq replarly aince the project• wre built, but recognitiOD ••• 
not ude of the1e 'benef lt1 in the project autbcnisation and no co1ta hoe 
been allocated to them. Th• moat prominent eons the•• u recftatioa. 
l.eaardla•• of whether recreation 19 a plamlad activity, every new r•Hrvoir 
automatically create• a new .,,1,.,1n1 hole and people ju.t natui-ally take 
adYant ... of it. Recreation haa recently become a bis butneH • for 




The theoretical efficiency fr...,ork for water reaource deciaioa9 
bu developed alowly becaU8e it 1a only recently that people of 11ADJ 
countriea 1uNe begun to think of water u a 1c.arce ruource. Most re• 
aource• co be uaecl for one or more of a mmber of purpo••• · Allocation 
to one purpose often mean9 foreaotna or deferrin& or reducing their use 
for other purpo•••· lcoD011tc• haa 11UCh to contribute to the aolutioo of 
water probl .. , but •aninaful ecoaoaic aalyaia require• larae quantitie• 
of technical data. Becauae of the uay·•Wed characten of water policy, 
the e.cODaBiet, lawyer, political 1cieuttat, and euatneer each hne a voice 
and .ut be hea'rd ill order to under1tand econcaic• tn water policy. 
ror ao•t re1ourcea, the pricing •chani• can be U8ed u a choice 
criterion reflecting the vieh of conaU111era back to uaere of reaource1 
•uch u water. Price• ca be uaed conveniently ill allocatiDg water u1u 
within a •lnal• firm, and ecaetiM• between ftru. However, for aany 
uaea of vatMr, the pricing eyetem cannot be ued aa a choice-indicating 
•chanU.. The cltuena 1n the lower part of a watershed have no effec-
tive •au of upreaatng, through the price Mchaniaa, to faneT• tn the 
upper reachea of the vatereb.ed the relative value which they attach to 
water ••• and controb (i.e.• flood control) . There 1a little oppor• 
t.m.ity for the pricing •chuiam to be uaed in diverting water from 
irriaation or power generation to recreation purpoaee (Heady and T1-on1, 
43). 
The fact that th• pricing Mchanbra ta an inaufficient bub for 
final control of water ua• and allocation doe1 not imply that the 
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principle of thia choice criterion ehould be di.acarded. Stucky aaeerte 
that "economic• indicate• that the mal'ut •Y•tem, baaed on eupply, and de-
mand (and price), cau be depended upon and ahould be depended upon to 
allocate theae water• to their future u•••• whether they etay in their pre-
aent or lllOV8 to acne other me" (97, p. 78). If a 110lt efficient ue• or 
control of water la to be effected, the pricing mechanian:a muat be retained--
with •ante qualificationa and modification, of cour••· Problema a11ociated 
with the pricing mechani111 (in it• attempt to manure and reflect the 
relative value of water in ita different ute.a) are di•cua1ed in Chapter 4. 
What conatitutea an efficient allocation of productive aervic•• or 
rHource1 depend• upon the objective• of the economic •y•te• or commnity. 
Though aany objective• have been •Ull••t•d or appear implicit in IOlllll 
public water progr ... , 1 yet to date economic evaluation• of public aaenci•• 
have been concerned priaarily with the increue in national income. '11lia 
ii all the 1110re 10 for a developing economy, lilt• that of Ghana, where th• 
main empbuia of re1ource uae i• put upon incree11ng the gro11 national, 
aa well u per capita, income. The following dilcua•ion will therefore 
be confined to the problem of bow an efficient allocation of water reeource 
inveat.ent can be approached, given that the objective i1 to incr•••• 
national income. 
1 
S•• Beady, E. o. and J. P. Tilmon• (43): "Planning and legislation 
in re1pect to water reaourcea •hould have one doatinant coal: to raaiai&e 
lona-run aocial welfare from th••• re1ource•," (p. 49). Alao ••• MaaH, 
A., .!!, .fl. (69, Chapter 2). 
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Plan of Work 
Thie tha•il u concerned with efficient ue of water to ant.in 
national inco.a. It purport• to do thla by, fir•t. brinain& into focu 
the cOD.11equance• of alternative water project• and ••lecttna thoae pro-
ject• which attapt to achieve the •ociety'• objective• with minima of 
avait.ble re•ource•. Then. ve maat couider all tba alternative us•• of 
water and ••l•ct tho•• which are in Un• with th• relative d-.ncl of water 
to •octety. A third couf.cleratton--vhich u uaually of great Saportance 
when the aoal of the aociety b to autatse econoaic velfare--u equitable 
dutributiOD of the product or ineama of the water ruourc• -a potential 
u•r• and benef lciariea. 
'lhe treatiae will. therefore. be divided into two aaiD ••ctiom •• 
fotlOlf•. Part oue vill be concerned with allocation of water n•ourc• 
iaftat.rat moaa altenative water 1upply project•··• review of the 
au.er al principle• and appU.catlOD.1 of coet-benaf it technique•. In Part 
Two ve ab.all take a given the .. jor inv••tmenta that have been Md• in 
d ... , irrigation canal• and other water faciliti .. , and cOD8ider the 
eff tcient allocation of the available water 1upply between the caapet!Qa 
uea to aatai&e •octal product or net iD.ccae. In taldna the1e invut• 
Milt• a ginn, we ••~ that the river ha been quite fully developed 
by tbata--•u will be the cue of the Volta B.inr very soon. For l•H 
developed river •Y•t- thu approach ia potentially helpful in the 
planntna of inve•baalt•. 
A •hort chapter wf.11 be devoted to the allocation of th• inc~ and 
benefit• deriftd fr• water in an equitable fuhion aoaa indi•iduala 
vithiD the eocfaty. And ,,. aball conclude with a bibliography. 
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CBAPrER 2. GXNEW.. ClllT!RIOO PROBLEMS 
Introduction 
There 18 no price .. chaniaa within &<J\f•rDllllnt which point• the way 
to high-level econaaic efficiency, that 11. to the correct allocation 
of reaourcea .-.ong "indutrie•" or broad aovet"mMntal functiona. In 
fact• ''the only market that ext.ta for mo1t aovernmant product• ii a 
political proce11" (Mei.am, 74). Again, then ia no coiapetitiv• force 
that induce• lower level efficiency, that ia, the adoption of •thod• and 
equipment which carry out each function at ainimm co.t. Bec&\Ule of th• 
lure of profit• aiid threat of bankTuptcy, private ftn. are under prea1ure 
to •••k out profitable innovation• and efficient method•. Thia ••arch 
bu led to an increuing ue of formal quantitative analy•ia--aainly the 
~ar10\d technique• in the field of Operation• R••••rch, •uch •• Linear 
ProST-tns •thoda and mod• b bued on the Theory of Game•. Even in the 
abaence of ayat ... tic analyab, aoae firm ia likely to dilcover more effi-
cient •thod• through trial aud error. Other firu copy th• imiovatlon, 
and tho•• that fail to do 10 begin to 1uffer lo.1e1, and the proc•11 of 
"natural 1election" tend1 to eliainate thea (3, pp. 211-221). 
In 1overm1tnt, however, there ii no profit lure, and promotiou or 
1alary 1ncreue1 do not depend upon profita. Molt of the co1t of poor 
deciaiou doe• not fall on tboee who make thea. The incentive to ••ek 
profitable innovationa and efficient •thod• ta, therefore, not a atrona 
one. 
Thua becau.e of the 1overmMnt'1 lack of a coaspetitive aarket 
.. chani.811, formal analy1ia of alternative actione aay be e1pecf.ally 
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rewarding in the public 1phere. Choo11ng among alternative• entail.a the 
uae of rule• or criteria. which are 1illlply the application of the formal 
quantitative maly1u. In the field of watH· n1ources development. the 
C'l'iteria mo1t c~only encountered are (i) the "llequirementa" approach, 
(ii) Mailma Gaina aiDUll coat• methods, (111) Either Gain or Coit Fixed, 
and (iv) Coit-Benefit analy1u. Of theae, the Coit-Benefit (or Benefit-
Coat) analyail ii the ao1t illlportmt in the evaluation of vater resourcu 
p'l'ograma--henc• it will be treated in full (Chapter• 3 throuah S), while 
the other• will only receive a eumnary treatmant. 
The ''Requirement•" Approach 
Thia technique ta uaed by government aaenciu at varioua levela of 
decilion-.aking. Officiala in.apect a problem pertaining to water uaage 
and 1et up a "required" tuk or performance characterietic. Coat, that 
i1, vbat 18 to be aacrificed in order to obtain the requirement, i• given 
little or no explicit con1ideration: the requirement i• 1et on the baaia 
of "need0 or payoff alone. ''R.equlrementa are often eet by looking at 
'need' without regard to coat not only when aelecting broad program• but 
aleo when chooaing the mean1 of carrying them out" (74, p. 12). The 
defects of this procedure are apparent, the ao1t important being that, 
by ignoring the co1t of a courae of actiou, the requirement• approach 
1.pore• the worth of all other alternative poHible actions. Al. Paul 
Douglaa pute lt, ''with thia approach . it la not unnatural for a •ilitary 
1ervice to procure, for example, all-hair wrestling mat• even though they 
co1t about twice u much •• the half-hair-half-wool mat• that are used in 
moat gymnaaiuma" (19, p. 17.5). 
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A water reaource program only had to paaa the following f&aaibility 
taata: "Can the performance characterietic be achieved? Can the necaa-
aary budget be obtained? Doe1 the nation have the neceeeary total re-
1ourcea?" (74, p. 11). If the program paH•• the feuibility te1t1 it 1A 
41dopted; if it doe• not aome adjuatmenta lllU8t be made . 
The "'B.equirementa Approach" ii an inefficient criterion for evalua· 
tion of water reaource progrmu--the "optimum" program, the one that 18 
regarded aa the requirement•, ia derived by diaregarding fund lf.aitationa. 
In Ghana ftmd limitationa are everywhere vieible and place• an upper bound 
not only on water reaourcea development but alao on all economic activitiea. 
Hence, it ii obvioualy unwiae to ignore fund limitations (vhich will very 
likely remain with ua for some year• to come); nor shall ve have to ignore 
the payoffa and the coat1 of alternative programa in the aelection of the 
optim\a program. 
Maxima Gainl Minu1 Co1ta 
If gaina and coats can be meuured in the aaae unit, to maximize 
gaina-minue-coeta can be considered an acceptable criterion for choo1ing 
some inveatment prDjects over other1. By the coats of a project ia meant 
the gaina that could be realized if the water resource were used in ita 
next beat alternative employment. Thua 1uppo1e three water reaource 
prolt'au ara being compai-ed: A yield• 100 unit• of gain, B yield• 75 
unita, and c yields 50 unite. Then for project A, gains and co1t1 are 
100 unit• and 75 unit• reapectivaly. When coata are viewed in tbia vay--
aa opportunity coeta in next be•t alternative eaployment-·it becomea 
obvioua that to m.axhai&e gaina-minua-co1ta ls equivalent to maxil:aizing 
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total aaina. With reference to the three progrmu in the example above , 
project A 1a the one that uximiz•• gain.a-minu•-coate (100 a1nua 75) and 
it i• al•o the project that yield• the gTeateat total gain in the circuaa-
1tance1 po•tulatad. 
Altbouab this procedure provide• u• with a 1uitable way of '.-king 
the moat of whatever action. can be taken,' itl application 1a Uaited 
only to the cc:aparatively fn occuioua when gain.I and co1t1 are com-
•n.urable . 
Either Gain or Coit Pixed 
Tb••• two criterion-fora are e1pecially uaeful vhen co•t• and gaina 
cannot be •uured in the aaae unit. Aa Mcl(aan puU it , ''what would be 
the meaning of the ability to de•tr01 ten target• minua one billion 
dollara?" (74, p. 47). In •uch a aituation, where it 1a iapoHible to 
maximize gaw ainua coat• , the next-be1t procedure ia to 'coutrain' 
or '1et' either the coat• or gain• and try to get the moat for a given 
co•t or to achieve a •pecified objective at ie .. t co1t. 
Theae two criterion-for111 ere equivalent, if •ize of eit~r gain or 
coat is the 1ame in the tvo te1t1 . U the maxima gain criterion leada 
to a policy which yield• $Y &am a fixed budget or co•t of $X, than the 
ainimua coet criterion will aleo augaeat the .... policy for a preapeci-
fied gain of $Y--that ie, the policy which acbievea the preepecified 
gain of $Y at a coat of $X. According to McKeau, the two criteriou-
form alao yield the 8811111 amount of 1nfol'111&tion " if calculatiOl18 are 
carried out for llUUlY different ecalee of coet and gain . " Aa a re1ult 
of their equivalence , the choice between thee• two teat• depend• largely 
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upon whether it le gain or cost which can be fixed with the greater degree 
of 11correctoe11 . " 
How is the 'correct• gain or co1t fixed? In other word• • how doe1 
one go about ftxin& the right achievement or budget? If the achievement 
or budget ia 1et uncritically. the test criterion degenerates into the •••• 
"requirement• appToach." U•ing Paul Douglas' example again. it might be 
taken as given that we "need" all-hair vre1tli.ng ut1; and the analyaia 
would eeek the cheapest way to achieve that "requir8118nt." 
To aet the achievement or co1t critically. the following procedure 
bu been •uaa••ted. Several tuk1 or 1cale1 of effectiven••• are e1ti-
mat ed by •••usain& several budget 1izea. If a particular 'ayatem' t. 
preferred for all tuka or budget•• that eyatem f.8 dominant and ia choaen . 
If no particular 1ystesa 18 dominant. then the deciaion"'1Ulcer haa to draw 
on further information in order to set the right taalt or budget . 
Whether there exiets A dominant aystem or not, the decialon-maker , 
in order to make use of the analysb, 1D.U8t Hlect the scale of the taalt 
or budget. He baa to know the cost of achieving different tuke or the 
potential achievements with different budgeta--haretn lie• the importance 
of e1timating the reault• for a variety of budget• or tasks . However, 
it ia not alway• possible to experiment with all poaaible acales of 
achievement or cost. because the COlllJ>utattona would be too expensive and 
voluminoua to provide any net aeaiatance. Hence, the analyst ahould do 
more than simply estimate •everal taaka foT given budget aize1 or several 
budget• for given tuka. Be should make same inquiry into higher-level 
criteria for the society or comaunity and alao eatabliah their relation-
1bip with lower-level criteria. J'or example, he baa to aak (and muat try 
lS 
to an.aver) the que•tiona: vb.at tuk (or budget) u c0111i9tent with higher-
level criteria? Ia a capability of •upplying 100 million Kirb. of hydro-
electric power too 1QUCh or too little in view of the over-all aiJllS of the 
i.Ddutrial development program? If the analyst can obtain reuonable 
anner• to th••• qua•tiona, the analyaia can then be easily coaverted into 
a higher•level eub-optindmation problem. At aome higher level, the appro-
priate criterion u taken u given--that u, to carry out the hiaher-lcvel 
tuk at miniaum coat, or to aet the moat out of the higher-level budget. 
Thia acceptance of a tuk or budget a1 given at •ome high level la com-
pletely different fraia, and far 110T• efficient to, aettiq 0 requiremant•" 
uncritically all the vay up and down the line (74, p. 48). 
The above criteria have been de1cribed only briefly, and so the 
ae"nral ccaplicationa in the criterion problem have been ignored. Prom-
inent amon1 the•• c:oaapl1.cati01ll an uncertainty, co1te or 1aine occurring 
in different period•, secondary benefits or coat1, and "int.mg1ble1." 
In moat cues, coats or saiu which occur in different time period• are 
not of equal value. Int.ngiblea and the degree of uncertainty about a 
project'• coet and &•In cannot be pTiced--they cannot be expr••••d in 
* tel'1118 of th• principal or cOSDm unit that i• being uaed, and hence 
..at •cmehov be tabn into account "on the et.de. " If enough weight 1a 
attached to intansible effecta, the neatne11 of any analyaia 1• likely to 
• If 1•in• are .. aaured in ten.a of dollar•, tho1• •ffecta which 
cunot be ao •uund are intangibl••· If no •inal• unit u uaed ex-
ten•ively •nouah to be regarded u a ca..>n den•f.nator, there ii no 
but. tor diating\auhing at all between t.ngible and intangible effect•. 
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be greatly marred, and the relationahip between the ••timatea of gain and 
* coet can.not reveal the preferred policy. Becauae of uncertainty. th• 
.. tiaat•• of coete and benefit• are uaually aver-.ge or expected outc011111a. 
It ia known in advance that eetimatee may be off the mark: benef itl of 
irrtsation project•, for inatance, depend upon such factor• •• teclutolog-
ical 1nnovation1 that affect relative pricee, and the actual fertility of 
the soil; and th••• thing• cannot be perfectly foreseen . A auggaeted 
method of treating uncertainty •• well •• intangible• ia "to avoid con-
cealaent and to preHnt acae quantitative indicator• •11 
Secondary, or indirect, banefitl and coata 1 on th• other hand, can 
be evaluated in the mark.et place. The complication th••• aecondary 
effecta introduce into the analyaia ta vhethar or not, and for what 
purpoae, thue indirect effecta 1bould be coneidered and added to th• 
primary (or direct) one1. Direct coat• are defined to be the value of 
the aooda and aervice• needed for tbe ••tabluhment, maintenance and opera-
tion of the project and to aake the imlediate product• of the project 
available for uae or aale. Direct benefit• are the value of the tm.diat• 
product• and Hrvicee for which the direct c08te were incurred. Indirect 
benefit• are the value• added to the direct benefita as a reault of 
ectiviti•• "•temdng from" or "induced by .. the project. 
tit. cOlll]>lications conaiderationa will be taken up again later and 
fully treated in connection with the coat-benefit an.aly•i.a, to which we 
now tum. Unlib the a...ary treat.ant 1iven to tha other criteria, the 
* In a ••nae. unc.ertainty can be regarded aa an intanaible, but u 
an eapeci.ally "ubiquitoua 11 and •ianificant one. 
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coat benefit &Mlyeil will be uteneively diacu.aad. It la the critet'ion 
111110et camonly uaad by water reeource development agencies and otlutr 
agencie• of th.e government--for var1oua reuona: e.g., the leHom of 
coat-benefit analyaia are relevant to the use of quantitative analy•i• 
(for eltmnple. operation• research) for private firuul, th• moet direct 
connection being to the comparison of net profit• to the agricultural 
firm from different operation•. Moreover, whatever can be learned from 
coat-benefit analysis haa a direct applicability to the coapariaon of 
alternative actions in other governmental activities. The general 
•thodological problema encountered in the eatimation of damqe reduction 
due to flood control project• aro essentially the same aa thoaa for the 
estimation of potential damage reduction attributable to certain defenee 
operations . (For further diacuaaion. aee 74, pp. 16-18). 
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CHAPTER 3. cmT-BENEP'rr ANALYS t.s 
Introduction 
Co1t-benef it analyei1 ia a practical way of .. ae••in& the deairability 
of project•, where it ia important to take a long view in the ••n•• of 
looking at repercu91iona in the nearer and further future, aa well at a 
wide view in the 1en1e of allowing for eida-effacta of 1llAllY kiDd• on 
many peraona, induatriea, regiona, etc. That ia, it impliea the eruaeration 
and evaluation of all the relevant coet• and benefita. Thia f.nvolvu 
dr•ing on a variety of traditional aectiona of economic atudy--production 
ecoumlica, public finance, welfare ecODOlllic1--and trying to veld these 
component• into a coherent whole. Although the aubject DU1tter of co•t-
benefit maly1ia hu appeared u long ago u 1844 in Dupuit'• clu1ic 
paper on the utility of public worka (20), the procedure haa come into 
praainence only within the p .. t three decadea. In the United State• OH 
of the f ir1t uae1 to which the co1t-banef it analy•i• vu put wu the 
evaluation of navigation project•. The River and Barbor Act of 1902 
required a boat:d of eQgineer• to report on the de•irabUity of Arrq Corpe 
of Enain••r•' river and harbor project•, taking into account the llllOUDt 
of commerce benefited and the coat. At thia time the coat-benefit analy•i• 
vaa conaidered to be puYely "an adminiatrativa device owing nothing to 
econcmic theory and adapted to a atrictly limited type of 'Federal activity--
th• impTovement of navigation" (37, p. 3). Con1equeutly, valuation tech· 
niquea were confined to tangible coat• and benefita. 
In the 1930'•• with the Nev Deal, the idea of a broader eocial juati-
fication for projects developed. The Flood Control Act of 1936 thua 
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authorized Federal participation in flood-control achemea "if the benefit• 
to whomaoever they uy accrue are in exceH of the ••ti.mated coats." The 
practice of making analyses then epread to the other agencie• concerned 
with water development projects. The purpoae waa not only to juatlfy 
projects but also to help to decide who should pay. By the end of 
World War 11, agencies had broadened their approache1 by includin& in-
tangibles u well aa aeeonduy or indirect benefit• and coat•. Since the 
war, great advance• have ken made in the development and application of 
reaaonably aophi1ticated techniques of economic analysis in the duign 
of water resources projects which are effective in preventing the con• 
atruction of uny mi.economic project•, yet no aingle technique oceupiaa 
1uch a favorite position with economiau u the "traditional" coat-benefit 
anal711.9·-thia le evidenced by the great nUlllber of booka and journal 
articles written about this procedure. A noteworthy contribution to the 
literature on coat-benefit analyeil is the "Green Book" (49) (a vork of 
an inter-agency cOlllllitte.e aet up in 1950). The book la an att-.pt to 
codify and agree on general principle• which are couched in the language 
of welfare economica. 
Like any other technique or criterion, the coat-benefit analysis 
can be uaed inappropriately u well a appropriately. '11iere are two 
general l1aitationa of principle (a1 df.etinct from the many aore of 
practice, referred to a.e "camplicationa" or weakneHea--to be diec:uaeed 
later) which eaaily come to light. :First, cost-benefit analyaf.a as 
generally underatood ia only a technique for taking deciaiona within a 
framawork which bu to be decided upon in advance and which involves a 
wide range of conaiderationa, many of them of a political or aocial 
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character. Secondly. coat-benefit techniquH in their pre•ent form are 
leut relevant and. 1erviceable foT large-1iae inveatment decuiona. U 
invutment decieiou are 10 large relative to a given econ~ (for 
81-.ple • a aajor dam project in a nsall country, aa la the cue with the 
Volta River Project in Ghan.a) that they are likely to alter the con1tella-
tion of relative output• and price• over the whole econCIJIY, the 1tandard 
co1t-benefit technique t. likely to be inadequate, for nothing le•• than 
aome 1ort of general equilibriia approach would 1uffice in 1uch cuea. 
'lbil me&n.1 that the applicability of the technique to underdeveloped 
countrie1 ie likely to be leH than 1a U8Ually thought to be, 1inc.e 10 
uny inveatment projects involve luge atructural changu in 1uch areu . 
But, a. Pre.at and Turvey (82) argue, thi• limitatioo abould not rule out 
all applications of the coat-benefit technique in auch countrie1. In 
fact, given the 1bortaae of capital re1ource1 in auch countrie1, the CQ1t-
benef it analy1u play an illportant role u a "a tarter" in the appraisal 
and Hlectlon of puticular projectl. The point to be underatood 19 
aimply that one auat be awue of the Undtatione of the technique when 
applied to underdeveloped countrie•. 
The Marginality Principle 
It hu already been pointed out that co1t-benefit analyeu 1a a w-.y 
of Htting out the factor• which need to be taken into account ill uking 
certaiu economic choice•. Moat of the choice• to which it bu been 
applied involve inve•tment project• and deciaiona--w'hetber or not a 
particular project u econc:aically jutifiable, which ta the but of 
•eYeral alternative pTojecta, or when to undertake a particular project. 
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It 1e the apre•a•d policy of the federal water re•ource• agenci•• to 
undertake oaly tboee activiti•• or project• for which the incremental 
benefite uceed th• incremental coat•. The criterion of the co•t-benefit 
analy•ia that ia ued to indicate the relative .. rtt• of altemative pro-
jecte u th• ratio of benefit• to coat. According to the "Green Boolt." 
"the ratio of benefit• to co•t reflect• both benefit and coat valu•• and 
18 the recamanded buie for compariaon of project•0 (49, p. 14). Tb.• 
rule 1• not to •««iaiae the ratio, or even rank project• according to 
benefit-coat ratios, but 1a eiaply to exclude project• with ratio• that 
are lua than unity. That u, the benefit·coat ratio, U8\Bing proper 
-uunment of alternatiTe co•t•, auat be over one for tba vhol• project 
and for each of it• aubproject•. There will be a net lo•• if •ub•taadard 
project• are ca.blued with jU9tifiable projecta. If a project A, yieldtug 
poaitive net benefit• of 10 u cc:abined with project B, yielding a net 
benefit of ·5, the total ia +5 all right, but the net gain to the econmy 
can be increued to +10 et.ply by trauferrq productive ••rvice• from 
project B to other uaea vti.re the value of their m.arainal product will 
equal their co•t•. 
In practice, it often happen• that project• vith the higher benefit· 
coat ratio• are regarded aa preferable to thoae with lower ratio• (neg• 
lecting intangible conaideratione). The n\llber of project• with relatively 
high ratioe influences the ai&e of the budget, and the rankina of projects 
accordtna to the benef it·co•t ratioa help• deteraine the particular ... ,. 
urea to be undertaken with a given budget. 
A proper application of the aarginal principle require• that the 
aarginal net benefit• be zero. Thu .. ma that it .at not be poHil>l• 
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to increaee total net benefit• by making the else of the project larger 
or ... uer. • J'or exmple, the dam miet be neither too high DOT too lov; 
the channel aiat neither be too deep nor too •hallow. Ordinarily it 1• 
iapoHlble to tell whether the •is• of a project ta "just cornet," etnce 
data on the coat• and benefit• of marginal increment• ueually are not 
given in project reporta. In general, however, engineer• ••• to be 
110tivated to build projecte which utilize the "full pby•ical pote.ntialitie1 
of the 11te" (that u, build up to the point where incremental coat1 rue 
abarply) rather than to be aovemed by a compariaon of incremental co1ta 
an4 benefit•. An adoption of a technique or practice which vould compare 
marginal coata and return• would be very helpful. 
The ''Right" Criterion tn the Coaapariaon of Project• 
Choice involvu maximisation and ve have to diacuH what it 11 that 
decuion-aakara want to matais•. The forms lat ion which beat cover• 
110•t coet-beneflt analy••• 18 u follow•: the goal 1a to aaiaize the 
pre.en.t value of all benefit• lea1 that of all coata, aubject to apecified 
conatraint1 (82, p. 686). 
In order to arrive at the "right" criterion, it ta neceaaary that the 
nature of the project• (or the appropriate altemativea) which are to be 
•ubaitted to coat-benefit .naly•i• ahould be made clear. If project• A 
and B are to be ccapared , t~y have to b• fitted into their appropriate 
contut•. Tbua if the alternative• are the procureMnt of aachine• A and 
• The eumple 18 taken from lox and Harff.ndahl (26, p. 201). 
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B, each machine baa to be fitted into a context that includes all other 
currently uaed equipment, varioua decisions and operation• in the firm 
and all relevant man-made and natural feature• (such aa communications 
network and climate) (74, p. 50). We then compare the alternatives A 
and B by compa~ing the gains and costs of a system that include• A with 
those of a ey1tem that includes B. 
However, if one authority ia responsible for producing A goods and 
B goods and the choice ia reatricted to judging between A good• inveat-
ment projects of different aizea, then it must take into account the 
effect of producing DlOre A gooda on its output of B goods . Many compli-
cation• are encountered here: relationships between A and B goods may 
be on the supply or demand aide, they may be direct (in the aens• of A 
influencing B) or indirect (in the 1enee of A influencing C, which in-
fluences B) and etc. An illustration i1 the operations of an authority 
reaponaible for a long stretch of river: if it put• a dam at a point up-
stream this will affect the water level, and hence the operation• of 
existing or potential dams dCMnatream. 
Another problem associated with formulation of appropriate alter-
natives ia that of interdependence. Suppose we want to ccaipare three 
interrelated proposed actioll8 A, B and c--that ta, the reeult1 of A 
depend upon whether or not, aay, B ia in exietence. Thia interdependence 
po1e1 no difficulty, other than increaalng the computational burden, if 
only one of the three proposals is to be undertaken. In this case, the 
compariaon between propo1ala A, B, and C reaolvea to aimply comparing, aa 
before, reat-of-tbe-ayatem-plu1-A, reat-of-the-ey•tem-plua-B, and reat-
of-the-ay•tem-plua-C; the choice ia baaed on the gains and coats •••ociated 
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with these. But sometime• two proposal• are to be cho•eu, or project• 
are to be ranked for future reference•, with a viev to proceeding down the 
liat aa far H the budget will go. In theee circumatances, there may be 
trouble ahead, because •• •oon aa one of the project• 1• to be conatructed, 
the other evaluations may change. McKean (74) gives the follCJW'iD8 example. 
We want to compare three project•: A (a water•h•d plu• a reforeetation 
project), B (the watershed plus a foreet-fire control program), and C (the 
watershed plus downatream levee•). Suppose project A turns out to b& the 
bHt, with project C u the second-beet. The queation posed here ie: 
' 'Will project C continue to be the eecond-beat after project A baa been 
put into operation?" Not neceHarily, because reforestation (project A.) 
will re.duce the worth of the levee• (a "competing" project) and increase 
the worth of fore•t-fire control (a ''complementary'' project). 
The upshot of the diecuasion on appropriate alternative• ia that it 
ie necessary to recognize interdependencies in calculating benefit• and 
cost•. When projects are interrelated, the correct procedure 1• to 
cc:apare the •Y•tema that are actually being con•idered: A, B, C, A plu. 
B, B plua c, A plua C, and A plus B plus c. There ia no clear-cut or 
correct independent ranking of project• that are themselves interdependent . 
Aleo involved in the selection of the "right" criterion ia the choice 
of an appropriate di•count rate. '11le literature on the choice of appro-
priate intere.at rate• for public inveetment project• i• voluminoue; but 
there ia a wid••pread agreement among econoraiata that from an efficiency 
point of view a rate is required which ia more comparable with private 
ratea than tho•• used currently or in the paat. But on examining the 
ratea that are uaed in the private aector, one bec<aaa confronted with 
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variou. que•tion•. Even if one can Hlect • •inale or averqe ri•k·free 
lCJl\&•term tntere•t rate, what aigniftcance can 1'• attached to it? Straight 
•ay we run into the old argumente about whether aaarkat rate• of intereat 
do bear any clo•e relationabip to the marginal productivity of inveet:ment 
and time preference or whether the relationahip ia 10 blurred aa to be 
imperceptible. 'Both pure theory and iaperfections in the capital market 
are thua involved; and it ia not within the •cope of thia the•ia to 
ex..ine the conceptual aspect• of cbooaf.ng a diacount rate for water pro-
jecta. 
In ccmputing gain• and coeta for each project, we mu.at allow for 
time difference•• becauae we attach different significance to the ame 
..aunta if they occur at different timu. Thil allowance 1a often made 
by diecountf.ng future amount• and converting each atreaa to ita present 
value. Our choice criterion then becOID9• one of maxfaizing of "present 
worth", a tera which muna the present value of gains mi.nu.a the preHnt 
value of coats. 
Once the relevant alternative• have bean clearly identified, the 
choice of a teat criterion then beca111H dependent upon what interest rate 
i• uaed to diacount the future benefits and coeta (neglecting uncertainty). 
It bu been auggeeted tut if there ta no capital rationing or if reaale 
value u relevant, the urket rate of intereet •hould be u.ed for diacount• 
ing. Bence, U the invea~nt bud1et can be varied by borrowing money at 
ao.e market rate of interest (--1.e. • "no capital rat toning"), one ahould 
UDdertat. all project• which baYa poaitlve J>T••ent wortha when discounted 
at the madcet rate; or. in the cue of interdependent project•, one •hould 
cboo1e tho•• which have the hiah••t poeitive present worths when the 
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atreams are discounted at the market rate. 'lb.is criterion impliea that 
we ehould invest until the internal rate of return from. incremental invest-
ment ia no higher than the market rate of intere1t. Internal rate of 
retuYn of an investment project ia defined .. the rate of discount which 
makes the present value of the project'• receipt atream equal to the 
pre1ent value of ita coat strema; that is, the rate of di.lcount which llake• 
the pT&1ent worth zero. If a $100 inveatment provide• a yield of $5 per 
year in perpetuity• it• internal r ate of return 1e S percent. The above 
criterion, therefore, etatea that if one can borrow money to finance inveat-
ment project• at a market rate of interest of 4 percent, be ahould under-
take all project• which have internal rate of return greater than, or equal 
to, 4 percent. Renee, in general, wi th no capital rationing, the 1'right11 
criterion for the correct aet of inveetaent projects ie 11mu:1mua pre1ent 
worth when the streama are discounted at the market rate. 11 Thia does not 
tmply that 11 the11 naarket rate ia an unchanging rate or an unambiguoua con-
cept. But it l'imply meana that if the size of the agency'• inveat:ment 
budget can be adjusted to the conditiona 1n the general inveatmnt market. 
then the diacount rate •hould reflect thoee reinveatment opportWlitiee. 
In many countries (and 11110re true of the underdeveloped countriea) 
capital ia a scarce reeource, so that inve1tment project• are conaidered 
under the conditione of capital rationing. In Ghana, where tho water 
Teaources d•velopment program (which led to the aelection of the Volta 
River Project) 1• conaidered in the framework of capital rationing, the 
water development agency hae no re .. on to uaa the markat rate for diacount-
ing; the available capital or inveatment budget ia fixed and it might 
either fall short of• or go beyond, the point where the 'urginal" internal 
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rate of return equaled the market rate of intereat. Under this circum.atance, 
it ia euggeated that the appropriate diecount rate ehould be the 11margin.al11 
internal rate of return, that ie, the rate of return from the project'• 
111Arginal inveatment. Thie diacount rate, therefore, ie the •ame aa the 
yield that could be earned in the nut-beet alternative project. In order 
to obtain the preferred set of inveatuaent project•, we muat know the marginal 
internal rate of return. The important queation here ia how in practice 
is the marginal intern.al rate determined. Ona method i9 to di.8count the 
atre8Dl8 of net benefit• at varioua rates and find the diacount rate at 
which the budget ia exhaueted by projects with a positive pre_eent worth, 
that ie , with gain streams whose preaent value• exceed those of their coat 
etreazu (1, p. 48). The lower the rate used for diacounting, the larger 
the nU11ber of projects which are 11econom1cally juatified"--that ia, which 
have poaitive pre1ent wortla. Bence, at aoaae rate of dbcount, the amount 
of "economically juatified" inveatment is equal to the budget. Thia rate 
ie the marginal internal rate of return. the rate that makae the marginal 
project have a zero pre1ent worth. The1e pToject1 with po1itive present 
worthl that exhauat the bud3et conatitute the correct aet--the set that 
yield• the maxiumm present worth with the given investment budget when the 
atreaiu are dilcounted at the marainal internal rate of return. Thua in the 
more general caae of allocating a fixed budget (i.e., under conditions of 
ucapital rationing11), the ''right 11 criterion for 1electing the economically 
efficient set of investment project• ii the 11maximuation of preeent worth 
for a given inveetment budget when the 1treama are discounted at the mar-
ginal internal rate of return." The bat ic idea of thil criterion ii to 
keep high-valued capital from being put to low-valued uaee. 
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In dealing wlth interdependent project• (under condition.1 of capital 
rationing), only rough reault• can be obtained. If we are pTapared to 
accept rough reault•, the analyd.a can be done in tvo partl. Pir1t, the 
beat project ••t (i.e., the beat mix of interrelated project•) 11 aelected 
by uai.ng a dlacount rate which i• believed to be "about right"--that b, 
the di.acount rate cloaeat to the marginal internal rate of return). Sec-
ondly, the pTojecta contained in the beat mix are ranked on the baaia of 
their intern.al rat•• of return. The hfaher-ranldng projecta can then be 
aecept.ed until the budaet ia uhaU8ted. Al alre&dy mentioned, thb pro-
cedure i• rough in that there :La alvmya the danger that the cambinationa of 
interrelated project• may be vrong in terma of the marginal intern.al 
rate of return which finally emergea fron the analyais . But if a ranking 
ia to be made, the internal rate i• an acceptable baaia provided that the 
interrelationahipa are properly taken care of "on the aide", and prOYided 
* that t he net r•c•ipt atre- can be reinveated perpetually at that rate 
(74, p. 91; and 2, p. 941). The rate of return 1.a a ranking device only i 
the "riaht" criterion, u already 1tated, ia the maiaml pre•ent vortb 
for the aiven investment budget with the marginal internal rate of return 
aa the diacOUDt rate. 
Ecbtef.u, while agreeing vitb KclCaan that the "right" inv••t:Mut 
criterion for aelecttna project• ahould be able to ebooae a aet of 
* MargoU• (71) arguea that KcX.m' a uaumptiona that the benef lta 
are reinveated u Ulllf&rranted. The benefit• are not available to tbl 
IO'ftnmaDt for inve1tmant. The bemfit• are incaa.1 received by irri-
gation far.era, inhabitant• of flood protected citie1, etc . , who will 
iuftat or con1U11111 the benefita (p. 105). 
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project• which would give the maximum present value to the nation, differ• 
fran McKean in his statement of the investment criteria. Ecutein pro-
po1e1 aa a di8count rate, the rate at which the taxpayers privately value 
the fund1 which they provide through taxation to finance the project--
thil rate ia referred to as the "•ocial co1t of federal capital" and ha1 
been eatimated at S to 6 percent (21, p. 99). Eckstein defend• this u1e 
of a private rate by urging that government agencies should accept the 
ethical judgraent that conaumere' 1overeignty with regard to intertemporal 
choice 1hould dominate. A private rate of intereat should, therefore, be 
used in determining the choice of project• and the eue of public 1nveet-
•nt1. 
Thie di1count rate obviously aesumea that the preferences of current 
population ehould dominate the preference• of future generatione. Eckstein 
(21) and ICrutilla and Eckatein (60) recognize this underlying a1aU11ption 
and argue that in the political proce11 the future ia not valued •olely 
in terms of the preference• of the current population: the beneficiariea 
1bould be future generation.a u we 11 &• the current one. But they U9e the 
ti.ma preferences of the current generations of taxpayers a.a the bui8 for 
the choice of a discount rate--arguing that the •election of the particular 
generation or generations whose preference• should be considered ia a 
purely arbitrary one. Though the economiat cannot decide which generation'• 
welfare ahould be 111.&Ximised and therefore be cannot "scientifically" chooH 
a discount rate, be can be helpful in the •election of an appropriate 
eocial rate of time preference. In the field of water re1ource1 the 
economiat can carry through the analyai.8 at aeveral rate•, one of which 
would be Eck.9tein'• social coat of federal capital, and he can then advise 
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the IOftrnMUt on the ttM impllcatiou of the different ratn . 
!cute in'• inveatMnt criter1cm-·max1mtze preaent value by valuing 
income atraama in term of preference• CIOll8 pair• of future yeara--
yielda nault• (a ••t of projecta) which aay be quite different frc. thoee 
obtained by Mcban'• "right" criterion. For ez-.ple, in the kutilla-
!cbt•in atudy of the Bella Canyon cue the aonrnmant '• high dm ho a 
higher benefit-coat ratio than the Idaho Power Company'• thrH•low-d• 
propoeal when a intareat rate (maTatnal internal rate of nturu) of 
.0025 ia uaad. When they uae an intereat rate of 0.055, the aocial C08t 
of federal ta:ua, the three low d ... are judged 90re efficient. 
In practice, however, Mcban'• "ri&ht" criterion of ''uxhua preaent 
worth for a given invutment buqet, with urgf.nal internal rate of return 
u the diacount rate" •till c--..nda a msc:h auperior reapect a.on& gonrn-
Mnt ageuciea than doea any other illveatMnt criterion. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE "Caa:t.ICATIONS'' AND CONSTRAINTS 
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The "Complications" 
Thus far the selection of the appropriate criterion has been accom-
pU.ahed by abstracting frOlll time and uncertainty. Of the many iseues in 
economic evaluation of water projects one of the most disc:useed and least 
clarified is the problem (or problems) associated with tillle. Government 
agencies as well as various economists treat time very differently. These 
differences among economists has often been cited ae a sitpl of iunaturity 
of the state of economic science ~hen dealing with time. 
Whatever decision is made about the beneficial consequences which 
should be attributed to the goal, the benefits muet be aggregated over 
a great uaany years . If the benefit• in different years are not equiva-
lent, and everyone aaaumea they are not, then weights must be antgned so 
as to permit addition and CODlparieon, that is, there is involved the 
selection of a discount rate for pairs of years. We have seen that to 
select the discount rate the identification of the characteriatics of 
the goal over time u not enough; imperfectioua in the capital market, 
uncertainty and the planning hor!Json create conatraint• on the action• of 
both government ageuciee and private parties. Should uncertainty enter 
into the •pecification of the goal, i.e., are two expected value• with 
different variance• to be differently valued; or should it enter into the 
criteria• 1.e., ahould we use a rule which gives greater weight to more 




In the 1phere of private deciaion-maki.ng, "nonoptimal" criteria 1ucb 
u payout period• have been u1ed for the choice of inve1t11ent1. UH of 
theae criteria would be inefficient if the entrepreneur• had full knowl~e, 
but they are re1orted to becauee they give greater weight to more certain 
conaequence1. 
Eck1tein di1tinguiahe1 between uncertainty related and unrelated to 
time. U unrelated to time, u in vatet' re1ource problems (e.g., uncer-
tainty 1teua1.ng from technological change, and major unexpected modifica-
tions in the character of demand), he defend• 1afety allowance• on the 
coat 1ide. bperience vith thil kind of uncertainty underscores the 
de1irability of maintaining flexibility in meeting future de.and•. Thil 
can be encoure,ged by 1uch aean1 u a higher diacount rate Ot' a 1horter 
a11uaed life for project• (26, p. 202). Either action 1hould in theory 
have the effect of reducing the n\IDber of project• which are "economically 
juatifiable." However, Bcbtein propoae1 to add a rilk premba of only 
1/2 to 1 percent to the intere1t rate to allow for thi• type of uncertainty; 
thia adjldted intereat rate ia then uaed to calculate the expected value• 
of the various projecta. Thie 19 a mild adjuatment, e1pecially for pro-
jects with an expected life of well over SO yeare. H4 juatifi•• thi1 low 
ri1k premium which i• unlfol"lll for all projects by treating the 1oven:ment 
ae a firm. project• u one of itl inveatmentl, and then uka what ralt 
the government program u a vhole incur• becau.e of the one project. Thia 
argument reeulta in an adju1tment for uncertainty in the correct direction, 
the reduction in preaent value increa1ing with the life of the project, 
but it miaaee the major problem. KargoU.• (71) argue• that the government 
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and ite agenciee muat chooae among project• and tbia choice ahould be 
affected not only by the expected valuee but alao by the probabilitiea of a 
range of benefits and coata. Uniform riak premiums hide the diveraity in 
pToject8 which r81\ge frm watershed treatment with uncertain hydrology and 
product demand, to urban water supply where the engineering technique• 
and market• are far better known. 
McKean believes that it ia deairable to reduce uncertainty, but that 
not enough ia known about the probabilities of the range of outca.ea or the 
utilitiea of the different ranges for the analyat to develop a cert:ainty 
equivalent . He, therefore, 1uggeeta a 1upplementary table which would 
sum the uncertaintie1 of the parts of the analy1ia into one grand 1tate-
mant giving the subjective probabilities of the range of outcomes. It 
ie then left to the government to evaluate the riaka. 'lb.la explicit 
treatlllllnt of uncertainty 1e preferable to the eole presentation of expected 
valuea or to a uniform adju1tment for all projects. 
Because of uncertainty, it 18 alao important that serioua conaidera-
tion bt given to project de1igna which retain flexibility of action--for 
example, by uaing general purpose rather than epeci&liaed deeign or by 
ueing leas durable structure• in eaae cases. Uncertainty can al10 be 
allowed for in the aa1ea1111ents of annual levele of benefit• and co•te. 
The varioua waye in which uncertainty inlpingee upon coat-benaf it analy1i1 
have ~eu well discuaeed by Dorfman (69, Chapter 3), Eckstein (22, Sec-
tion 5), Bir1hle1fer (46, pp. 139-41) and McKean (74, Chapter 4) and need 
not be elaborated here. 
Though it la generally recognized that the appraisal of the goal 
should include con1ideration of uncertainty, yet neither the various 
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economists nor the government alter the "right" investment criteria 
because of uncertainty. 
Iptangiblee 
Benefit-coat analysis require• quantification both in phyaical and 
economic teriu. Quantifying in economic terms involve• evaluating on the 
buu of a cOlmOI\ denCllllinator or weight. In practice thi.e meaM aoney, 
although other denominators are conceivable and are ued in economic 
theory. The neceHity of quantifying in teru of 110ney ia frequently 
pointed out aa a wealcneaa of benefit-cost analy1ia. 
At firat glance, one portion of benefit• and coat1 appear rather 
obvious and 11mple to evaluate. Theae are the product• which can be aold 
for money and are referred to u " tangible" benefit•, e •I • , value of 
cotton produced by an irrigation project; and "tangible" coata are tboae 
aaaociated with auch products, e.g., the coata of cotton, the dca and the 
productive aaricultural areu flooded by the reHrvoir. In addition to 
theae products to which monetary values can be aasigned, there ia a aet 
of product• which enter into the individual valuation• but for which no 
aarket price ia available. Theae are usually called " intangible" benefits. 
The 1ntangiblea are poorly named. They are not eluaive, juat difficult 
to add into a sum along with balea of cotton and gallon• of water. In-
tangible• include items like livea eaved in flooda, regional growth, and 
recreational uae. Intangible benefit• and coat• are quite aub1tantial for 
acne projecte. However, the benefit-coat ratio• concern only tangibles. 
All of the tangible benefit• (diecuaaed below) are auane.d up to provide 
a aingle nUllber, the numerator of the benefit-coat ratio. Intanaiblea 
are di.ecu11ed in supplementary document•, that ia, are taken into account 
35 
"on the aide" . It ta then up to the government to decide (on the buia 
of scxue nabuloua utility function•) among project• vith diffarent combina-
tiou of tangible and int~ible benef ite and coat•. 
Four claHe• of tangible benefit• can be diatinguiabed. nteir defini-
tion. 1a relatively clear but their meuurement remalu poor. (1) lrrlga· 
tion benef1U are valued a• the inereaae in fana income vbicb could be 
attributed to the water. (2) Plood control benefit• are the mathematically 
expected loH•• anrted becauae of the project. (3) The navigation bene-
fits are tbe differenee• between the cost• of •hipping by water and thoae 
by the cheapest alternative. Ecbtein point• out that the cheapeat alter-
native ta usually rail and it• coats are e1tlmated at the rate• charsed 
rather than by uqinal coata. In Challa. becau•• of the lack of raUvq 
comaunication between the Narth and the South of the country, the cheapeat 
alternative to navigation on the Volta Lab 11 motorway. (4) Power bene-
fit• are the coata of gene~ation of equivalent paver by a private at ... 
power plant. 
the uea of the coat• of the cheapeat altemative a a benef lt cm 
••pecially overatate benefit• when it ii a1a\llllld that the lOllered coata, 
becau1e of public inve1tment, would lead to an increue in activity. Por 
exaeple, if people were illhibited from •hipping becaWte of high rail (or 
roed) ratea, or if they did not locate in an area becauae of the high ponr 
rat••• then the price of the cbeapeat alternative i8 more than they would 
in fact pay. Tbu1, the tangible benefita are far from certain. TJ\eye 
have been eteady 1Dapr09'emllnta in th• concept• of benefit• and coat• but 
th••• have not overcome the diff lcultie1 of .. aaurement and e1pectally 
the pTOjection of the ••timate• into the future. 
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In general, the intangible benefits are of a different order. It 
ill not aimply the difficulty of finding market evaluation•, such as in 
the caee of recreation benefits . Moat of the intangible benefit• are 
concerned with social evaluation of such matters aa conservation, the 
family-sized farm, mobility o~ resources, income redistribution, impli-
cation• for public health, or balanced regional development. It ia 
poeaible that through 80llle ingenious means monetary values can be found 
which uy make i.ntangiblee comparable to the tangible•, but H yet no 
guide• have been developed for this research. Until that tinae, the 
propo1ale of McKean and others to quan~ify th• intangible• as much ae 
possible and preaent them in aupplenMtntary document• may be all that is 
poHible. 
Externalities 
McJCean diacueaea apill-aver effect•, Eckatein diacuaaea inter-
dependencie1, which are forma of external economiea or diaecon011ie1. 
De1pite thia lack of an accepted name, it ia clear from the authors' 
analy1a1 that they refer to the wide claaa of coata and benef ita which 
accrue to bodiea other than the one 1pon1oring a project, and the equally 
wide ia1ue of bow far the aponaoring body ahould take them into account. 
MclCean (74, Chapter 8) diacu11e1 at length the dt.tinction between 
pecuniary and technological external economiea (or apillovera). H• 
argue• that progenitors of public inveatment project• abould take into 
account the external effect• of their actiona in ao far a• they alter 
the physical production po•aibilitiea of other producers or the aati.a· 
factions that con1umera can get from given reaourcee; they ahould not 
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talcs side-effects into account if the sole effect ia via prices of products 
or factoTa. Tb.e distinction really reata on the following bub: "tech-
nological apilloveTs affect the physical outputs that can be obtained from 
other producer•' physical inputs, while pecuniary epillovere do not . '' One 
example of technological spillovers is when the construction of a reservoir 
by the upstream authority of a river baain necessitates more dredging by 
the downstream authority. An example of pecuniary 1pillovera ii when the 
improvement of a road leads to greater profitability of the garages and 
restaurants on that road, employment of more labor by them, higher rent 
payment• to the relevant landlords, etc. In general, this will not be an 
additional benefit to be credited to the road inveatment~ even if the 
extra profitability and auy net rise in rents and land values is simply 
a reflection of the benefit• of more journeys being undertaken than before, 
and it would be double counting if these were included too. Consequently, 
we have to eliminate the purely transfer or distributional items frOIJl a 
cost-benefit evaluation: ''We are concerned with the value of the incre· 
ment ~f output arising from a given investment and not with the increment 
in value of exiating uaets" (Pre1t and Turvey, 82). In other words, we 
meaure coats and benefit• ou the aasumption of a given set of pric.ee, and 
the incidental and 1 consequential11 price changes of goods and factore 
should be ignored. 
This distinction is obviously not a simple one to maintain in prac· 
tice; there are some reeulte from investment which are partially tech-
nologic•l and partially pecuniary. It is sometimes difficult to unravel 
them bacau1e acae of the transfers occasioned by investment projects may 
affect the di1tribution of income significantly, and henee the pattern of 
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demand, But u a general guiding pTinciple the distinction is moat 
valuable. 
Tba application of thia principle illlpliee that an investing agency 
must try to take account of obvious technological apillavera, such u the 
effect• of flood control measures or storage dams on the productivity of 
land at other point• in the vicinity . In aome ca.eea no explicit action 
may be needed, e.g. , theae effects may be internal to different branches 
of the same agency, or aome ayetmn of ccapenaation may be prescribed by 
law. But in others there abould at leut be an attempt to correct for 
the moat obvious and important effects. Although in principle correction• 
are needed whatever the relationship between the interacting organizations, 
it lllllSt be expected that in practice the compulsion to take aide effect• 
into account will be much greater if a emall number of organizations are 
involved than if the external benefits (or coata) are spread over a 
large multitude of individuals. The conclusion reached in this 1ection ta 
that technological spillovers should, and pecuniary spillovers should not, 
be taken into account in the comparieon of projects, even if all are 
economic. 
Secondary benaf its and coat• 
Argument• about secondary benef ite are baaed on the notion th.at •ome 
pecuniary apillovere can be properly included in benefits. McKean (74), 
Ecltatein (21) and Margolis (71) all note that 1econdary benef ite are 
"indubitably a epecies of epillover," though they do not fall squarely 
into any one of the categories already discuaaed. 
39 
There are two major classes of secondary benefits and coat• considered 
in the practice of benefit-cost analyau. The firat comprhee those which 
accrue in connection with the processing of the immediate producta; thia 
clue is referred to a.a "atem:d.ng frOOl. " The second class coa.priaea thoae 
benef ite and coats alleged to accrue because expenditures by the producers 
of the imlaediate products stimulate other econaaic activities; this cla11 
is referred to ao 11induced by. " The essential principle can be made clear 
by taking the caae of irrigation which reaulta in an increase in grain 
production, where the direct or primary benefit• are meaaured •• the value 
of the increase in grain output less the aasociated increase in farmers' 
coats. 
The increued grain output will involve increued activity by grain 
merchant• , transport concern.a, miller•, baket:a, etc.; that ii, it finds 
expression in the demand by processors for the inaediate products of the 
irrigation project, and hence will involve an increase in the pt:oceasora' 
profits. If the ratio of total profits in all theee "proceaaing" activ-
itiH to the value of grain at the farm is, say, 30 percent, then secondary 
beaef ita of 30 percent of the value of the increaae 1n grain output are 
credited to the irrigation project. The•• are the secondary benefit• 
"atenaing from" the irrigation project. Ciriacy-Wantrup (15) assert• 
that if tbeae "•tenaing" secondary benefits are (by •ome more or leH 
arbitrary accounting procedure) determined and added to the primary bene-
fits, a portion of primary benefits is counted twiee. Secondary benefits 
from proc•••ina uy also arise from the fact that the good• produced by 
a public project may lower market pricea. Since the iaaediat• producte 
are available to proce•aora at lower prices, the project then should receive 
40 
a credit for aecondary (net) benefit• equal to the price differential• 
time• the quantitiee produced. However, though the quantitiea produced by 
a public project may be large enough to have effects upon price•, such a 
situation per •• does not indicate additional profits from proceaeing. At 
best, euch additional profits are ehort-lived. The quantities produced by 
the product ehould be evaluated vitb the prices at which the•• quantitiee 
can be absorbed. 
" Induced" eecondary benefit•, on the other hand, are the extra profita 
made from activities which sell to farmere. The argument for including 
thla claee of eecondary benefit• la eupported on the academic level through 
analyeea baaed on Keyneaian economic•. In the practice of benefit-coat 
analyeia, however, this clasa of benefit• ia computed regardless of under-
employment among productive eervicea in the couree of general fluctuations 
of investment, eaving and income. Dealing vith thb claH under two uin 
aaeumptiona, MclCean (74) and Ciriacy·Wantrup (15) reach the conclueion 
that (a) when there ia full employment there really are no secondary 
benefit• at all, and (b) if in the absence of the project, certain re•ourcee 
would be involuntarily unemployed throughout the time period, ueually u 
much as fifty yeara, then the incomes of theae reeources throughout the 
time period can be regarded u a eecondary benefit " induced byu the pro-
ject. More realietically, theee reaourcea would be unemployed aver only 
part of the relevant period, eo that their incomes (that ia, the value of 
their product•) can be counted aa a benefit over only that part. 
The implications of thia distinction for co1t-benef it measurement• 
are that the extent of unemployment and underemployment 1m19t be projected 
and that the secondary benefit muat be calculated as the net inc01111a of 
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productive factora with the project minus their net incomes without the 
project. '11lua if any productive factors are pulled into full use from 
idleneaa or submarginal employment, the increased value of the product 
would be counted. In practice, it is not only difficult to predict the 
unemployment which would exist ~ithout the project, but it also requires 
"some boldnesa" to predict the effects of a project upon unemployment when 
''we have no foreknowledge of the reat of the Federal Budget. " A. a result 
of tbeae and other reasons, one ia forced to conclude from this analysis 
of secondary benefit• and coat• that all claaaes of secondary net benefits 
be dropped from consideration if the problem area is project selection; 
this is the moat important problem area in which benefit-cost analyaie ia 
presently uaed. 
Relevant prices 
The foregoing discueeione have been baaed upon the 89eumption that 
the iDaediate products or outputs of the public project are to be put 
to their beat u•••• and that the actual pricing ayetemvill not prevent 
this. What happens if the analyet can foresee that actual price1 charged 
vill differ from aarginal coat? Should this affect the procedure for 
valulng benefit• and coeta? 
If marginal coat decUnea until suddenly the expan1ion of output 
' 'hit• a atone wall" 1 the price 1hould be adjusted ao as to ration that 
output among the moat valuable ueea. When we are dealing with coeta and 
benef ita which can be expTeeaed in terms of tDODey it i• generally agreed 
that adjueteenta need to be made to the expected prices of future inputs 
and outputs to allow for anticipated changes in relative pricea of the 
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itenaa involved. including expected changes in interest rat•• over time. 
Sometime•• whan an output ie particularly hard to value, benefit& are 
assumed to be equal to the coet of the cheapeat alternative mearu1 of 
producing the eame service. 
Another problem posed for cost-benefit measurement• by the pricing 
procedure 18 deliberate under-pricing, that 11. deliberate setting of 
price below marginal cost. If this policy ie foreseen (e.g •• in an 
irrigation project) or predictable, it muat be reDleUlbered that the price 
set la too low to ration the irrigation water to ita best u1e1, ao that 
the water may not be devoted to the acreage where it would be moat pro-
ductive. In 1ucb circumstances• the benefit• should not be estimated on 
the assumption that the output (water) vill be used in any particular way. 
Though adjustments at:e needed for expected prices of future inputs 
and outputs, yet moat economists feel th.at movements of the general price 
level are irrelevant in the comparison of project• and should be kept 
out of the coet-benefit calculations; that ie, no adjustment• should be 
made for expected changes in the general price level. The purpoae of 
coat-benefit eet:f.aatea 1• that they should help us to see vbich choice• 
would take ua nearer to maximum production. So far ae efficiency in tbie 
aenae ia concerned, iaovements of the general price level are beside the 
pointi "the eHential principle 1.a that all price1 muat be reckoned on 
the same baaia, and for convenience this will usually be the price-level 
prevailing in the initial year0 (82, p. 691). Thua, if the price level 
riaea from 100 to 300 by the time the benefits occur, it is eimply in-
correct to aay that benefit• have trebled. 
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Ind iyb ibil itiu 
With •ome few exception•• market pricee are ueed to value the co•t• 
and benefit• of a project. So long .. illve1tment proceed• by 811Ulll incre-
meut1, the value of the output attributable to the inve1t:ment 19 elmply 
the price of an extra unit, or that price D1Ultiplied by a emall number of 
unite. Thie amount eatiafactorily uaea1ure1 vhat people will be willing 
to pay for the additional product. Suppote, how~r, that investment can 
be pr09idad only in a ''large lump" , 1uch aa a big re1ervoir or a canal, 
and that the extra unit• of output are large enough to affect the•• prices. 
Difficulties arise when one tries to uaeuure benefita and coete. In the 
ca.e of final product•, the benefit• accruing frca the illve1blent project 
cannot be mea1ured by multiplying the additional unit• of output either by 
the old or the new price. The former will give an overe1t1aate and the 
latter an undere1t1mate. What is needed b a meaaure of the addition to 
the area under the demand curve (area ABCD in Figure 2), which. on the 
aseumption that the marginal utility of llOnay remain• unchanged, i• an 
appropriate taeuure of the money value of the benefit• pr09ided, in the 
1enaa of u1e11ing what the recipient• would pay rather than go without 
them. When the demand curve 19 11.naar an unweighted average of before and 
after pric•• will 1uffice ; but more cOlllplicated technique• are neceeeary 
for other fonu of demand function--vhen they are known. In the caee of 
intermediate product•, the demand curve i1 a derived one, and 10 it ' can 
only be a perfect reflector of social benefit" if the optimum val fare 
condition• are met "all along the line" . If this condition 1a eatisfied 
the gro11 benefit arl1f.na frca a project concerned with intermediate 











Figure 2 . Valuation of benefits when indivisibilities exist 
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con1umer1' and producers' 1urplu1 with regard to any final product baeed 
on the intermediate products. 
If the indiviaibUity ia of any consequence, 10 far a1 coats are con-
earned, it will raise the prices of the input• uaed to build the chunk of 
equipment . Would the extra units of input multiplied by this higher price 
correctly meaaure their coat? No. On the coat• 1ide there ia a double 
problem, diatinguisbed by Lerner in his treatment of 1ndivisibilitie1 (65). 
First, it ia necessary to adjust prices of input• so aa to eliminate any 
rental element•, which vill be measured by exce1se1 over tranafer earnings 
in their next beet alternative uae. Second, analogous to the pYoblem of 
the deaumd 1ida1 as more and more of a factor ii absorbed in any one line 
of output the price of the alternative product which it might have been 
making rilea further and further. We, therefore, have to make a choice 
between valuation of the inputs at the original price, the ultimate price, 
or acme intermediate level. If we, again, make the aa1umption of linearity, 
a price halfway between the original and the ultimate levell will 1uffice. 
In practice, the adjuatmente for indiviaibilitie1 on the co1ta aide may 
be neceaaary at any particular tiaa, and hence are likely to be 'lllOre com-
pl.ex than those on the benefit side • 
• Market imperfectione 
Departure• from Pareto optimum conditions arile when monopoliatic 
elements or other imperfectioM in inputa or outputs market• are 1uch u 
to twist relative outputs t1t1ay from those which would prevail under 
* Thia section is based. largely on Prest and Turvey (82, pp . 692-693) . 
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campetitive condition.. In such cases, investment decisions based on 
valuations of coats and benefits at market prices may not be appropriate; 
failure to correct for these dbtoTtioa. is likely to lead to mballoca-
tion1 of investment projecte between different industries. 
The relevance of this point for public deciliona concerning invest-
aent ia eeveTal-fold. 
''First, if a public authority in a monopolistic 
position behaves like a private monopolist in its pricing 
and output policy its investment decbiona will not ccxnply 
with ·the principles of efficient allocation of resources 
unless the degree of monopoly is uniform throughout the 
economy. 
"Secondly, complications may arile when there is mono-
polistic behaviour at a later stage in the production 
proceas ••• 
11A third illustration 18 in respect of factor eupplles. 
If the wages which have to be paid to the labour ens•ged 
on an inVeatment project include IOlllll rental element and 
are greater than their marginal opportunity costs, then a 
deduction lllWlt be made to arrive at an appropriate figure; 
conversely, if wages are squeezed below marginal oppor-
tunity costs by monopaony practic••· 
"Fourthly, there naay be an average aver marginal coats. 
This raises the well-known difficulty that if prices are 
equated to short-run marginal costs, as they DN•t be to 
enaure abort-period efficiency, the enterprile will run at 
a lose • 11 1 
With respect to the fourth point, various ways of getting over the 
problem have bean suggeated (e.g., two-part tariff ayatena, discriminatory 
chargea, voluntary aubscription1), but there are anaga in all of them. 
If none of these 1uggeated 11solutiona" are acceptable one must be prepared 
1 Preat and Turvey (82 1 p. 692). 
47 
to countenance lo•ses. Investment deciaion are here baaed on notions of 
what people would be willing to pay or what the project 11ought to be" 
worth to customere, as Hicks (45) puts it. 
The above ex.amplea point to the inapplicability of investment decision 
rulea derived from a perfectly competitive state of affairs to ~ world where 
such a competitive situation no longer holda. There are two poasible waya 
of making the neeeasary 111easurement adjustments: either a correction can 
be made to the actual level of costs (benefits), or the costa (benefits) 
arising froa the market can be taken aa they stand but a correaponding 
correction has to be made to the estimation of benefits (costs). The 
firat of these two methods is, generally, the lea• complicated to compute. 
Ta.xea and control• 
Another case of divergence between market price and social coat or 
benefit 18 that of tu:ea on expenditure. There ia a atanding controver1y 
pertaining to the inclusion of taxes and duty in the coat-benefit calcula-
tion•, either ae reductioruJ of project benefits or aa additions to project 
co•ts. Moat economist• prefer to mea1ure taxed input• at their factor 
coat rather than at their market value. On the opposite end of the pole 
are thoae who believe that "in computing the annual coat• of Federal water 
developments, for determining economic justification or for any other pur-
pose, there •hould be included amount• equivalent to the taxea which would 
have to be paid were the lands, phyaical improveiaenta and buainea•, if 
any, not exempt from taxation, whether Federal, State or local" (24, p. 192). 
Which position ia correct? 
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While private profit-making decision• 1hould allow for income and 
profit• tax payments, this should not be the caae in the public sector. 
Cost-benefit eatimate1, it should be recalled, are 1upposed to be guide• 
to the eet of efficient project•, and should, therefore, reflect all 
tangible coats and benefits to the economy. What one ia concerned with 
here, therefore, ia a meaaurement of coat which correeponde to the use of 
* real reaourc,ea but excludes tranafer payments. On the whole, tax payment• 
are not clo1ely correlated with the coats to the economy that can be attri-
buted to a particular investment. In fact, many tax payments represent a 
tranafer froaa one gToup to another . Bence, profit• or incoase taxea on 
the income derived by a public authority from its project are irrelevant 
1f government proposals are to be compared only with each other in order 
to •elect the beat eet of projects for a given budget. 
Collective goods 
Market price• clearly cannot be used to v•lue benefits which are not 
capable of being marketed. Thia leads ua into the collective goods iuue, 
1ee Sa.uelaon (SS, 86, 88) and Head (40). The eaaential point i• that some 
good• and services supplied by governlllent are of a collective nature in the 
een.e that the quantity supplied to any one member of the relevant group 
cannot be independently varied. For example, all members of the population 
benefit from defenee expenditure, all the inhabitant• of any given district 
benefit from an anti-malaria program, and all ahipa in the vicinity benefit 
from a lighthouae. Bowen (8) differentiate• between separately marketable 
* Tranafer payments do not repreaent genuine addition• to cost (or, 
alternatively, reduction• in benefit) to the natiou . 
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good• and eucb collective good• by the U8e of Figure• J(a) and l(b). 
Whereas aggregation of individual demand curve• ia obtained by horizontal 
tlaD&tion in the Figure 3(a) cue. it b obtained by vertical eumution 
in the cue of collective good• (71gure l(b)). Thi• reflecta the fact that 
though individual• may differ in their marginal valuation• of a given 
quantity of a commodity, they all con•ume the eame amount. in that each 
unit 18 conaumed by all of them. For example, flood control afforded to 
different individuals i• a joint product. 
* No one ba1 yet eucceeded in getting conaumer1 to reveal their pre-
ferencea regarding collective aooda; any rational individual conaumer 
underatatea hi8 de.aand, in the expectation that he would thereby be re-
lieved of part or all of hia •hare of the co1t without affecting the 
quantity obtained. 
The implication of thie for coet•benefit eetimates b that where 
comaoditie• ere aupplied at zero pricee or at non-market clearing price• 
which bear no relationehip to conaumer preference•, there le "no buie for 
arriving at inveetment decieiona by computing the present value of aalH." 
Of cour1e, the problem doe• not apply to collective good• alone; a whole 
range of good• and aervicee may be supplied free (or at nominal price•) 
by government for a whole variety of rea1on• • 
• Some attempt• have been aada to find way• out of thie illlpaeae, but 
these have not been fruitful. Samueleon (85, 86, 88) and Muagrave (77) 
have shown that even if the "nonrelation of preferences" problea ii 
ignored. there 11 still another major anag, in that there 1• no aingle 
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lnveetment criteria are rule• for the public agencie1 to follow in 
order to auctimis• the goal, 1ubject to c<>ldtraint1. The con1traint1 are 
tb8 inatitutional enviromMnt which limit• the choices they can make. 
Were it not for incompatibilitie1 among project• and for budget limita-
tiona, choo1ing all project• for which the pre1ent worth 11 po1itive would 
a11ure a aaximma. Given a budget con1traint but nealecttna incompati-
bilitie1, it would be 1ufficient to rank project• according to the 1i&e 
of their pre1ent wortha and move down the li1t until the budget was 
exluru1ted. But the combined uiltence of both budget conatraintl and 
inc0111patibilitiea are central practical probleta.1 of choosing an optimal 
expenditure program. 
Eckatein (22) baa an excellent cla11ification of conatra1nt1. Pir1t, 
there are phyaical conatrainta. The aoat general of theee ii the produc-
tion function which relate• the phy1ical inputs and output• of a project, 
but thi8 enter• directly into the calculation of cost• and benefit1. 
Where choice u involved between different project• or regarding the 11ze 
or timing of a particular project, external phy1ical conatraints may al10 
be relevant. Thua, one particular input may be in totally inela1tic supply, 
or two project• may be mutually exclueive on purely technological ground1. 
The1e external phyaical con1trainta alao include the incoaapatibility 
re1tralnt1 which are baaed on the recognition that (a) of all the included 
public project• that could provide a particular output or 1ervice, not 
more than one can be cho1en, and (b) the same facility (e.g., dma 1ite) 
can be uaed only once. 'lbil lut restraint, however, doe1 not mean that 
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tha dam (or the facility) can be uaed to provide only one function (••• 
Steiner, 96). 
'111.ere are alao legal conatrainta--what i8 done 111U9t be within the 
fr-..work of the law. Thia may affect aatt•r• in a multiplicity of Y•Y•, 
• ·I·, replated pricing, time needed for public inquiri••, U.mita to the 
activitiea of public agenciea, etc. We alao encounter adainiatrative con-
atratata, related to limit• to what can be handled administratively. Un-
certainty can be introduced by coutrainta, for example, by tba introduc-
tion of "•cma •inimum regret requirement." There are the dutributicm.al 
coutraint•, which are concerned with income diatribution and bued on 
the compenaation principle (of Kaldor, 52, and Scitovaky, 89) in the New 
Welfare Econoaaica . '1'ha notion that the choice between project• can be mad• 
aolely on the around• of "ecoaomic efficiency", because any unfavorable 
effect• on income diatribution can be overcome by making •OM of the 
aatn.ra CCllpenaate amne of the loaera , ia rarely applicable in practice . 
Preat and T\aney atate that it ii "perfectly po•aible" to compensate 
property ownera not only for property vhlch i• expropriated but al•o for 
property which 1e reduced in value. Similarly, it 18 poHible to levy a 
charse in reapect to property wbich bu been enhGlced in value. Th••• 
paymant• of ca.penaation and charge•, being lump 811118, are not likely to 
have any direct effect• upon reaource allocation. In aeneral, however, 
atteapta to &•t benef iciarie• to pay 110re than the marainal •ocial co•t of 
the project output• tbay couu.. vill affect the allocation of rHourc••· 
What•Y•r the raaaon for •ucb att .. pt•, the pricing policy adopted vill 
affect project output.a, and hence project coat•. Thu, coat• and benefiu 
are not independent of pricing policy. 
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Income distribution requirements may, thua, affect coat-benefit 
analysis in either of two ways. Fir1t, when pricing rules are laid dO'illl 
in advance in the light of political or social notions about income dis-
tribution, then the task is to maximize the present value of benefit. leas 
coats subject to certain specified financial requirements, i.e., subject 
to one or more constraints . The second way occurs when the authorities 
have not laid down any specific financial rules but do clearly care about 
income distribution. In this caae the task is to maximize the exceae of 
total benefits over total coats subject to conetraint• on the benefits le11 
coats of the particular groups whose economic welfare i8 of interest to 
the decision-maker. 
Finally, we have the budgetary constraints . Hirsh le if er (46) argues 
that such conatrainta ought not to exist: if the budgeting authoritiea 
"are worth their salt .. the amount allocated to the sub-budgeu will take 
account of the productivity of the projects available to them and the coats 
of obtaining the necessary funda. If this is not done, he asserts, the 
answer ia to recast the whole system of budget allocation. However, in 
the light of pa.at and present experience with planning in Ghana and else-
where, Hirahleifer's argument 11 rather unreali.atic. Many decisions 
relating to projects aelection (and planning, in general) are taken within 
the framework of a budget constraint, and the economist would be rendering 
the nation a greater service by helping to •ub-optimize within thi.a frame-
work, even if, ae a long-run proposition, be th:lnka in hie private capacity 
that it abould be changed. 
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CHAPTER 5. Stl?tiAB.Y AND APPLICATION OP ANALYSIS 
Sunmary 
'11ie most cona.on maxim.and or goal where project• involve only coats 
and benefits expre1aed in tel'ID8 of money is the preaent value of benefits 
less coat•. 
Investment criteria are rule• for agencies to follow in order to 
max1Jaige the goal, •ubject to constraints. Where no project• are inter-
dependent or mutually excluaive, where no time considerattcm1 are relevant 
aDd where 110 con1trainta are operative, the choice of project• which mui-
mize• the present value of total benef ita lea• total coat• can be expr••••d 
in any of the following four equivalent ways enumerated by Preat and Turvey 
(82): 
"(l) Select all project• where the preaent value of benefits 
exceeds the present value of co•t•; 
(2) Select all projects where the ratio of the pre1ent value 
of benefit• to pre•ent value of co•t• exceed• unity. 
(3) Select all project• where the constant annuity with the 
•ame pre•ent value u benefita exceed• the con1tant annuity (of the 
eemie duration) with the same present value aa coet•; 
(4) Select all project• where the internal rate of return 
exceed• the choaen rate of diecount." 
Once the varioua complications are introduced, more complicated 
investment criteria are required. McKean atatea that there is no single 
criterion which can put into proper perspective all the problema associated 
with different time patha. He auggeata supplementary table• to show un-
certainty and ti.me patba. Be advocate• u the moat significant partial 
te•t, which he refer• to aa the 11right 11 criterion, " the maxilllication of 
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preaent worth for a given inveatment budget, when the atre ... are di1counted 
at the marainal internal rate of return." Thi• propoaal i1 directed tovarda 
1electing the aet of beat project• given a budget limit. However, the 
aovenm.ent (e.g. , Congre11) U9ually deliberatea OD the individual project1, 
not the 1et. Therefore, an index of worthwbilenea1, a rank of preference, 
111U1t be aaaigned to a project. If this i1 needed, McICean 1ugge1t1 that the 
project• be ranked by the intern.al rate of return. It ii then better to 
eelect the alternatives with the highest pre•ent value1, proceeding down 
the lilt until the limited budget 11 exhausted. 
The irapact of the complicatione OD cost-benefit analyst• in terms of 
* the preaent value approach can be sunmarized as followa: Where the co1t1 
and/or benefits of two water-reeource projects A and B are interdependent 
in the een1e that the execution of one affect• the costs or benefit• of 
the other, they muat be treated ae conatituting three mutually exclU91ve 
project•, n-.ely, A alone, B alone, and A and B together. 
Mutual excluaivity can al10 arise for technological reaaon1. Thua, 
a large or a emall dam, but not both, may be put in one place. Whatever 
the rea1on for mutual excluaivity, its pre1ence muat be recognized and 
allowed for in formulating inve1tment criteria . 
Where there ia a choice of •tarting date it DIWlt be chosen so as to 
maximize the p~e1ent value of benefita le11 coat• at the reference date. 
Given a conatant budget limitation. an inveatment ecbedule which 
ehifta with ti.lie eo that each year aimilar worthwhile inveatment 
* Thia doea not imply that the 
moat convenient goal or maximand. 
capital stock at a final date. 
pre1ent Talue approach i• alway• the 
Other aaximand1 are poaaible, euch aa 
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alternative• are availatble, and benefit• which do not result in fund• for 
the agency, then the choice of project• abould be affected by the level• 
of future operating co1te. The greater the future operating coat1, the 
le11 fund• will be cvailable for later inve1tmeota, and therefore, the 
larser will be the n\lllber of future project• not adopted even though they 
are better than currently marginal product•. Mel.en avoid• tbil complica• 
tion by a11uming that the benef it1 prOYide fund• which cover operating 
coat• (and therefore the level of operating coat• i• not relevant), and 
that only current 1nve1tment funde are rationed. 
Conatrainta cauee th• bigge1t cmplicattona, particularly when there 
ii more th.an one of tha:m and vhen 1mtual u.clU1ivity and optiaal timing 
are al10 involved. lndiviaibilitie1 al10 complicate aatter• when con· 
1tra1nt1 are involved. The exiatence of more wortllllbile project• in later 
19ar1, coupled with the u1umptlon of a coaq>arable budget conatraint, uket 
it laportant to conaidar the future coD.8traint• explicitly. 
The achtev ... nt of our 1pecified goal·-n81111ly, the maximisation of 
pre1en.t value subject to fixed in'Yeatment bud1et--can be ahown graphically 
by th• Ula of Margolia' diqTm reproduced here a1 Figure 4. Inatea.d of 
1electin1 the. beet 1et of project• by the U1ual benefit-coat ratio Mthod, 
here a aU,ghtly different procedure b employed. ex ia the ratio of operat-
ing coat• to capital (referred to •imply u "capital inten.eity") and 
11 conatant over time. f3 la the ratio of benefits to capital. and ii 
coD.8tant over ti.. The project• under conaideration are ordered by ex. 
Given a conatant investment appropriation (i.e., fixed govermaent alloca-
tion for water re1ource1 development which ii conatant over time), the 





Figur e 4 . Maximization of present value 
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degTeea of capital intensity, a . 
OL is the production opportunity curve and it re.presents the highest 
~ . the benefits-capital ratio, of any project at a given a . In order to 
choose the beet project (or beat set of projects) we must ma:xitaize the 
present value with respect to a . After some algebraic manipulation, 
Margolis arrives at the following equation as the maximization condition 
for the present value: 
~ - [? 
da a + r 
where r is the level of the diacount rate; rM, rf, and rh are some of a 
aet of rays from r, each ray repreaenting a different benefit-coat ratio. 
In graphical tenu, thia 111axf.ndzation condition i• the tangency of rM 
vitb OL. The benefit-cost ratio line tangent to OL gives ua the optimal 
ratio 1n order to maximize the pre1ent value of the inveatment budget. S, 
ita point of tangency, tell• ua the beat a , or capital intensity. With 
thi1 knowledge of a , we can then choose the best project or the beet set 
of projects. 
Applications to Water Projects 
The principles set out in thil section (Part One) of the thesis have 
been 1a0et CCllllllOnly e11ployed 1n cost·benef it analyeie relating to two par-
ticular areae--water reaource projects etudiea and tran.eport projects 
atudiea. Theee tecbniquee aleo have great applicability in land-uaage 
•chemee (urban renewal, recreation and land reclamation), health, educa-
tion, reeearch and develoPlll8nt, and defense. 
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Our interHt 1a presently focuaed on water reaourc• projects. Water 
project• take many different forms; they may differ purely on enginaeriJla 
characteriatic1. The purpo••• of water inve1tmenta are aleo different and 
many--provieion of more water for an induatrial area, proviaion of 1rriga• 
tion water, prevention of flood damage, etc. In 10Qlll ca••• there aay be 
only one auch purpo•• in a particular project; 1n others it may be a 
ca.e of multipurpoae development. The detail• of coat-benefit analyai1 
inevitably differ from project to project. 
Thia atudy vaa prompted by the con1truction (1962-66) of the Volta 
River Project 1n Ghana. After aevaral yeara of con.aultationa and fea.1-
bility atudiea, the Government of Ghana and th• Kai.aer Eoginear1 of the 
United Statu agreed to erect a d• at Ako1ombo on the Volta l.iver, Ghana'• 
largeat river. The principal purpo1e of the Volta River Project vaa to 
provide abundant and cheap bydropower to the expanding 1nduatrie1 and 
thereby facilitate Ghana'• drive toward economic diveraification. The 
nut ao•t baportant benefits from the acheme were enviaaged to be irriga-
tion, flood control and n.vtaation. Other benefits were envieaged (1uch 
a. induatrial water to the Accra-Tema areaa and inland fiabing), but tbeee 
did not feature much in the coat-benefit eatiutea. Rav were the benefit• 
(and coat•) of thee• upurpo1ee" arrived at? Thia 1a the queation I want 
to addrea1 myaelf to in thia laet aection of Part One of the the1ie. 
Since the Volta River Project 11 a multipurpo1e 1chema, we 1ball look 
only at a few of these "purpoaH" for which it va. intended. We ahall con-
1 ider hydroelectric 1cheme1, irrigation and flood control 1chmllea--treating 
them, firet, u aeparate indiYidual projects, and then a. parta of one 
11Ultipurpo1e project. 
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The discussion is not necessarily baaed on the methods of evaluation 
actually used for the Ghana project. In fact, I intend to employ in this 
thesis only the atandard uiethods of measuring the benefits (and coste) as 
previously diacuseed. 
Hydroelectric power acheme 
'lbe ataudard way of meaauring the value of the extra electricity 
generated by a public hydroelectric sche:m9 ia to estimate the eavinga 
realized by not having to buy frDlll an alternative 1ource. Thia may sound 
aimple 1 but a cloaer examination reveals all sorts of complicated iaeuas. 
Conaidering the simple cue of a single public hydroelectric aource 
veraua a aingle private ateam plant, it 1a easy to aee that benefitl can 
be meuured by the coata of the moat econOlllical private alternative. AJJ 
Eckatein (21) abowe, this raisea a number of iaauea; e.g., a private 
aector station will not be working under cOlllpetitiv• conditiona, and ao 
ita charge• may not coincide with opportunity coata; private sector 
charges will not be directly relevant to public sector circumstance• in 
that they will reflect taxea, private sector interest rates, etc. Another 
point ariaee when a ne.w bydroelactric station provide• a proportionately 
large net addition to the supply in a region. In this cue (which ie the 
caae with Volta River Project's electricity generation) the alternative-
coat principle would produce an overeatim.ate of benefit•, and we are forcad 
back to a measure of what the extra output would •ell for plua t he increased 
consumer•' surplus of it• purchaae•. (See diacuaaion on indivisibilities, 
!upra). Presumably a aurvey of the potential mark.et for the power will 
p-rovide •ome of the needed infonaation, but the difficultiea of making 
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reliable eetimatee remain enormoua. 
Let ua consider a second case wbeTe a new hydroelectric station haa 
to be added to a whole supply ayetem. We want to measure the aount of 
power produced by the new hydroelectric atation. The amount of power pro-
duced and the times of the year at which it will be produced depend not 
only upon the pbyaical characterietic. of the river providing the power 
but aleo upon the co•t characteristic• of the whole electricity supply 
eystem and upon the behavior of the electricity conaumera. "The supply 
ayatem conetitutee a unit which ia operated so ae to adniaize the operating 
coat• of meeting conauaption whatever ite time pattern happens to be." 
Therefore, the way in which the hydroelectric et~ion i• operated may be 
affected. by alterations in the "peald.ne1a11 of conaunq>tion, the bringing 
into aervice of new theraaal etationa, etc. 
Now applying the principle of measuring benefit• by the coat aavinge 
of not building an alternative atation, we see that, becauae of the eyatea 
interdepend9nce juat deecribed, "the only •anin,gful way" of measuring thie 
co•t •4"11.na ie to "ucertain the difference in the preaent value of total 
eyetem operating coat• (in the two case•) and deduct the capital co•t• of 
the alternative•." A simple comparison of the two capital eoata and the 
two running costa will give the right answer only if the level and time 
pattern of the output of each would be exactly the amne, a condition which 
b abaoat never achieved to. practice. Aa a reeult, ill general, a very 
complicated exerci•• involving the simulation of the operation of the 
whole eyet• u required (Turvey, 105). Simulation 1110dele for other 
water reaource projects can be found in Kaase ~ al. (69). 
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Finally, lrutilla and Eckatein (60) point out that even if two or 
aore hydroelectric etationa are not linked in the eame diatributioa and 
cOMumption network, there aay be production interdependence. An ex•ple 
ie that when upatrema atationa in a river buin hsve reaervoira for water 
etorage, tbia 1a hishly likely to affect water flows downatream, and hence, 
the generating pattern of atationa in that area: 
"Once there 1a a steady flow of water from the AkoaClllbo d .. 
(th• main d• of the Volta B.iver Project), it ia planned to con .. 
atruct a weir and power atation at Ip~, twelve ail•• dawnatreaa, 
vbich will create a net additiao to the project'• power capacity 
of 86,000 kilowatt•. '' (In a footnote): ''The actual capacity 
of tba ~ station will be 140,000 kw, but ita operation will 
reduce th• capacity at Akoaombo by .54,000 kw" Killick (.58, p. 394). 
If technoloaical interdependence of thia type 1a not internalised by bavf.na 
both typea of atation under the .... authority, it vill be neceaaary to 
have IOIM •Y•t• of compeneatory arrangement if we want to cut down re .. 
eource aiaallocation. 
Irrlgation 
Preet and Turvey contend that 11nce it i1 aeldam poaaible to aacertain 
directly the price at which vater could be sold upon the campletion of a 
J>TOpoeed irrt.sation project, and •inee thil price vould in any cue give 
no indication of COMUMre' eurplue, the "direct" benefit8 of an 1rrf.aa-
tion project have to be eetimated by: 
"(1) forecuting the chanae in the output of each aaricultural 
project, leavil1g out thoae output• which, like cattle feed, are 
aleo input•; 
(11) valuing and eumatna th••• change•' and 
(iii) deductina the opportunity co•t of the chanae in all farmiq 
input• other than the irrigation water 
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in order to obtain the value of the net change in agricultural output 
consequent upon the irrigation of the area" (82, p. 706). 
In many countriea with reasonably well-developed agricultural exten-
sion and adviaory eervicee, forecaete can be made for additional output, 
whether sold in the market or coneumed on the farm. Some diff icultiee are 
encountered in trying to obtain these forecast•. Even in t .he abeence of 
any delay in the response of farmer• to new methoda, it often t~1 some 
year• for the full effect• of irrigation to be felt in the economy. Since, 
in addition, farmer• will take time to adapt, what is required b not juat 
a 11.mple lut of outputs but a echedule showing the development of pro-
duction over time . But thia u too coaaplicated to achieve in practice and 
uaually "the beat that can be done ie to make eatimatea for about two 
benchmark dates and extrapolate or, alternatively, postulate a diacrete 
lag in th• reeponae of farmer•" (ibid). Thie difficulty in preparing 
forecasts of additional output is due to the fact that we &Te dealing with 
the behavior of a group of people (vu., farmere), and hence the forecasts 
will depend aa much upon the agronomic condition• as aleo upon peaeant 
conaervatiem, superstition, etc . 
Poreca.ste are further complicated by the ever-present probability 
that farmer• may not follow an inc0111e-maximizing course of action. If 
this bappena, ve have to aubatitute or aupplement the projection.a baeed 
upon the aesumption of maximizing behavior with projection• baaed upon 
the aaeumption that the behavior of other farmers elsewhere conatitutea 
a uaeful precedent. 
With reepect to valuation, all the coaaplications already diacuaeed 
become evident. The amount the farmer get• for hie crop• may differ 
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markedly from their value to tbe c011111W1ity where agriculture i.a protected 
or aubaidi.zed, H in Ghana by the Marketing Board• for the varioua crops, 
or in the United State• (Ecbtein, 21). This prove• the point made 1n the 
text that when the condition• for optimal reaource allocation are not ful-
filled ln the rest of the econCJGIY, market price• become a poor guide to 
project coats and benefits. The lndivi.aibiUty problem alao aria•• when 
the increment in the output of any crop i.a large enough to affect it• price, 
so that there ia no unique price for valuation purpo1ea. Though output 
ahould be valued at a given price level consiatent with valuation• of 
other benefit• and coata, future change• f.n relative price• muat be taken 
into account. Hence, price projections aTe nquired and, u before, any-
thing from aimple extrapolation to highly sophiaticated aupply end demand 
studiee may be employed. 
Sub11atence output atill fortU a not 1n81.gnificant part of Ghana'• 
total agricultural output, and thu rai••• the age-old problem in social 
accounting about the appropriate valuation of 1ubsi.atea.ce output. (lor 
a complete diacussion on this subject, aee Preet and Stewart, 81). 
The secondary benefits associated with an irrigation project are 
tho•e which reflect the impact of the project on the rest of the economy, 
both via f.t1 increued 1alea to farmers ("induced" benefit•) and via ita 
increased purchases from them ("atetlllling11 benefita). Tk'8 appropriateneH 
of including theae benefits has already been diecuaaed elsewhere in thl• 
theale. Secondary effect• (co1t1 or benefits) may also arise becauae of 
technological interdependence among many irrigation 1chamaa--for example, 
the effects on the height of the water table in one area may •pill over 
to another district. 
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Any irrigation project vill have a number of other (minor) effect•• 
theae will vary frcn caee to cue. Some example• of tbeee effect• (taken 
fraa an u-poat atudy of the Sarda Canal in India, 78) are : 
Canal water 1a aleo uaed for vuhiug, bathing, and waterU. 
cattle. 
Silt 1a depo•ited at the outlet heada, which nece•aitate1 
caa.tant and laborioua cle&D.in8 of the channela. 
Some plot• of land have been made untillable by unwanted water. 
Man.y •uch effect• will be unquantifiable, but muat neverthel••• be rwml>er· 
ed in any maly11.a. 
!lood control 
'l'he major benefit• of flood control are the loa••• averted. The 
loH•• can refer to different type• of u•ets-·property, furniahinga, 
cropa, etc.; or to different types of avner•--f.ndlviduala, buaineH firu, 
gO'V'8rnment, etc. In all the1e caae1, the general principle ia to e1tillat• 
the aatbematical expectation of annual dcaq• ("on th• baaia of the U..kely 
frequency of flood levela of different height•") and then reaard 1ucb 1111118 
u the aniam annual amount• people would be willing to pay for flood 
control •aaurea. Other benefit• which 1111.11t be taken into account include 
woidance of death by drowning, avoidance of temporary co1ta (e.a., evacua-
tion of flood vlcttsaa, epidemic1), and the po1aibilitiea of putt~ flood 
land to higher uae1 if the ri.ak of 1mmdat1on 11 eliminated. 
On the co1t1 1ide, the initial co•t• of the flood control work• and 
their repair and uintenance chargea muat be included. Since n do not 
find a fre.e land aarbt in many, if not all countriea, the coat of land 
acqui8ition for re1ervoir1, etc., ta bound to be arbitrary. 
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Principle• of private inve•tment alternatives do not have iau.ch 
applicability in the case of flood control project•--for many reaaona. 
Protection for one inhabitant in a district inevitably implies protection 
for another, and 10 we run into the collective goods problma; protection 
for one dietrict may worsen flood threats to another, and 10 thi1 bring• 
up technological externalities; flood worka often have to be on a large 
1cale and of a complex nature, and this bring• ua up aga1n1t the indivui-
bilitie1 and imperfect competition probleaui. I.a a result of the•e, one baa 
to try to e1timate wilU.ngnees to pay for flood protection by the "roundabout 
devices" already deacribed--market principle• fail to help ua. 
Myltipurpoae schemes 
In practice, many river projects have a number of purposes in. mind--
navigation, fishing, recreation, etc., in addition to tho•e diacuased 
above. For such projects, we not only con•ider the coat-benefit data for, 
say, different-sized hydroelectric 1tatiorw, but aleo we have to consider 
different combinations of, 1ay, irrigation and navigation improvements . 
Because of greater poasibilitiea of interdependence, the benefit• and cost• 
calculations become even moTe complicated. We, therefore, hne to take 
seriously the problema of complications already dealt with above (which 
Hat is, incidentally, by no mean.a exhaustive). 
Concluding Remarka 
As ia to be expected from the foregoing d18cuasion, wide divergencies 
of view have been e.xpreeaed about the role and usefulness of coat-benefit 
analy•is. Some people look upon it as "a practical revolutionary concept 
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of economic planning" (Hall 38, p. 173 and Mc~ean 74). Others like Arthur 
Sl!aithie• (94) aake a ekeptical appraieal of the usual evaluation methods 
and conclude that "judsment playe euch an important role in the eetlmation 
of benef lt•coet ratios that little eignificance can be attached to the 
preciae numerical reeulte obtained" (p. 344). 
Whatever the view one take•. it i• important to note that cost-benefit 
analyeie caueee queation• to be aeked (e.g., the justification of existing 
pTicing policy) which would otherviae not have been raieed. 
The caee for using coat-benefit analy1i1 is atrengthened, not weakened, 
if its U.mitat ions are openly recognized and indeed emphaa ized. We cannot 
upect thi1 technique to be of any uae if a project i• so large H to alter 
the whole complex of relative price• and output• in a country. It i1 no 
good expectina those fields in which benefit• are widely dtffueed, and in 
which there are manifest diver1encee between accounting and economic coats 
or benefite, to be as eaeily amenable to coat-benefit analyeia H other•. 
Nor i1 it realietic to expect that compariaona between project• in entirely 
different branchee of economic activity are likely to be ae me.ningful or 
fruitful H thoae between project• in the 88:11111 branch. The technique ia 
more uaeful in the public-utility area than in the social-eervicH area 
of goveYmaent. 
La.etly. it auet be emphaeized that even if cost-benefit analy•i• 
cannot provide the right answers, it doe1 play the role of ecreening pro-
ject• and rejecting those answer• which are obviouely l••• proaaieing. 
Inai1tenee on coat-benefit analyeia, therefor•. can help in the rejection 
of inferior project•, which are nevertheleu promoted for eiapire·buildina 
reuone. 
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PAllT 1.WO. ALLOCATIOM or WATll. BB'IWllN ALTEBNATIVI tJSIS 
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CHAPl'Etl 6. BCON<lfICS 06 WATER IN GHANA 
Introduction 
Ghana 11•• in a central poaition in WHt Africa. The country 1a 
roughly rectanaular in ehape and hae a total area of about 92,100 equare 
mile• (238 ,.537 aquare kilometer•). It le bordered on the north, eut and 
we1t by the atatea of Upper Volta, Togoland and the Ivory Coaat, respective-
ly; ita coa1tline of about 344 aile1 eztende 1outbvard1 into the Gulf of 
Guinea (•e• Pigure 1). !'Tom it• extr ... eoutheru point lyina at latitude 
4° 44' North of the Equator the country extend• about 420 aUee to a 
northenm:>1t point at latitude 11° 10' Rortb. The extreM eastern point 
u aiven by longitude 1° 12 1 !aet end the extreme we1tern point by lonai-
tude 3° 15' Weit. The Greet1Wich tr.ridian pu1e1 through the new harbor 
and tovuhip of Teaa, which u 1.5 ailes to the eaat of Accra. 
The eatiaated population of Ghana at the end of 1963 vu about 
7,400,000. Thu give• a population deneity for the whole country of about 
tbirty•one per 1quare ltilometer. Ghana 11 by no mean• a deuely populated 
country but by CCllllPart.on vith conditiou prevaiU.ng in other part• of 
Africa, Gbma' • population den1ity ii fairly high (Omaboe, 79). Ca.parable 
f tguree (for 1962) for •Ollll eelected African countrie• are 5 for Alaeria, 
18 for Ethiopia, 39 for Nigeria, 28 fol: Morocco and 106 for Rvanda (cf. 
United Nation• Demographic Yearbook, 1963). Africa a1 a continent u 
aparHly populated. Ite aver•a• deneity of population of nine peraom per 
equare kilometer compare• with 10 for America, 64 for Aeia, 87 for Euro1>9 
ucludiq the Scwiet Union, and a world-wide average deneity of 23. 
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Althouah Ghana'• population ia at the llOll81lt relatively low, the 
populat~on 1a arawing rapidly-•at an aatimated annual rate of growth of 
2. 6 percent. If thb rate 1a .. intalned the population will be about 11 
aillton by 1980 and clo•• to 19 million by the tum of the century• atvtna 
a11 averaa• danaity of 79 peraon.a per aquar• kil011ater. 
By alze and population, Ghana ta a 11aall country. Thia hu ita 
advantage• ancS duadvantagea iD tarma of the economic and aocial de"fflop-
•nt of the country. One advantage ta "the C011Pactneaa of the country 
which enable• it to eacape the trouble• and difficultiea facin& the develop• 
.ant of uny of tb• larae countrie• of Africa, Aaia and South Amrica." 
On the other hand, with a population of only about 7 aillion a aerioua 
lf.aitation 11 tapoaed on the aiae of th• domeatie market for a vide rana• 
of c~itt.ea and tbia in tum uy have aerioua repereu.aaiou on the 
ta.po of economic growth and development. Th• ••cape from thia, u 
Ghanaian.a aee it, 1a through the formation of an African C~ Market. 
The firat 1tep toward achlevina thil objective wu taken in May, 1967 
when repruentativea frOll all We1t African cmmtriea (except Guinea) •t 
in Ghana under the auapicea of the United Nationa Econoaic Commiaaion for 
Africa to draw up a plan for an Economic COllllUllity of Weat Africa--cOD-
aidered to be a forerunner of the continent-wide African Coimon Marbt. 
lccmoaic Geography of Ghana 
R. Saere•a..,.lti (100) ataua that the foundatiou of th• uiatina 
atructure of Ghana'• ec~ were laid during the lut decade of the 
nineteenth century and the firat decade of the twentieth century. Thia 
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vu the period dtn"ing which the ezport economy of the forest belt of the 
country vu dneloped and tran•formed. Prior to this the country bad a 
... 11 export trade but thia vaa baaed laraely upon the collection of 
uaturally-occurrlng for••t produce •uch •• palJI fruit• and brnele. kola 
nutl and wild rubber. TbeH ttro decade• •av th• replac-nt of thu uport 
trade by the product• of two major economic activitie1 • aold-aining and 
cocoa•fanaing. Theae two product• have dominated the econcay of the coun-
try for more than half a century now and they have dictated the pace of 
economic growth and the preHnt structure of the ecoft01111. A aiplificmt 
fact 1a that cocoa-growing haa been clo1ely integrated into the eubsiatence 
agl'iculture. Thie bu bad the effect of greatly reducing subd.atence pro-
duction in the country. Generally• the aiatence of a large sector of aub-
alatence i• a normal feature of moat underdeveloped countriea; 1n the rural 
areu the impact of money 1a not great and moat of th• f araina COllllUlllti•• 
produce for their own conamption. Information available (in 1963) on the 
pattern of houaehold conaumption in Ghana reveala a relatively aull degree 
of •ub•btence production. It vu ••tiaated then that the coaaumption of 
their own produce by producer• in Ghana •• a whole repreaent• about 20 per· 
cent of total hOW1ebold expenditure. 'l'bia 1.e not a particularly high figure 
conaidering that Ghana baa over tvo-thirda of h•r working population en-
gaged in rural actiYltiea . "The proportion of th•ir own produce conaw.d 
by producer• in urban com.mitt.ea la only about 7 percent although in the 
rural ccmamitiea it la aa high aa 31 percent. Even ao the rural houae-
holda •how a relatively high degree of eophiatication in their cooaumption 
pattern.a" (Olaaboe. 79). 
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'l'be ecanciaU tranafonaation to a 110dern export econ~ and the dear•• 
to which aubabtence ec~ u nClll betna chanaed, by c~rciaU.zation 
of it• re•ourcea, into an exchange ec~, have been duly reflected in 
the srowth of the Groaa ~atic Product. Ssereazwaki bu e•tiaated that 
over the W.nty-year period, 1891 to 1911, there vu a growth rate of about 
1.8 percant per anmm in tba Groaa l>ome•tic Product J!!I. egita in real 
term. Tbll repre1ent• a relatively high rate of growth in the atandard 
of living. 
Ghana'• upenditure on the GroH National Product in 1960 vu eeti-
mated at about Ht 940 million (i.e., $1,316 million). Thia u a J?!.I 
capita national income of $200 which proviclea Ghana with a ht.ah level 
of U.ring relative to other underdeveloped countria•. It can be cmpared 
with the $90 of Nigeria, the $120 of the United Arab llepubU.c (Egypt) 
and the $73 of India. Althouah the Ghana figure appeara to be high by 
the atandard8 of the underdeveloped countriea, it u atill low cc.pared 
with the leveh which h.ve been achf.ned in the dweloped and indU9trial-










Thea• ftgur., reveal the great maanitude of the difference• in tba 1tan4• 
ard of liv!Qg between the underdeveloped countriea and the developed coun-
tries of the world. 
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The low per capita national income of Ghana (compared with the 
developed countriea) creat .. a number of difficultiea concerning the 
mobilisation of aavin.a• within th• economy and the rate of ecODOllic growth 
which the country 1• able to generate through ita own re1ourcea. 'l'he 
raiaing of the R!I. capita national income 1a therefor• the main objutive 
of all development planning in Ghana. In order to achieve tbia the annual 
rate of grolfth of the aconOlllJ ahould exceed the mnual rate of growth of the 
population. The t'&te of growth per annum of the population th\d ••t• a 
lower limit to the real annual economic growth that usuat be obtained if 
the etandard of living 1a not to be allowed to fall. Szareaaevaki (99) 
analyaea the pel'f orrunce of the Ghana economy between the year• 1955 and 
1962 mid •how• that the Gro•• Doailatic Product ahowed a relatively high 
real t'ate of growth of abaoat 40 percent in thoee aeven year•. Thia vu 
an neraga ccapound annual real rate of growth of 4.8 percent, "a rate 
which i8 high by the atandarda both of the developed countriea and of 110at 
of the laH developed c:ountri••·" When the increaae in Gro1a Nation.al 
Product i8 considered agatnat the eetiaated annual increaae in population 
of 2.6 percent, n find a aubatantial rue in the average levela of U.ving 
during the period·-over 2 percent per annum. 
Tht. vell advanced atate of affaira baa been ude poa11bl• pT1ncipally 
by cocoa-sroving and minln& with it1 aaaociated conetruction woru. A.a 
with ll08t underdeveloped countriea, fuming 1a the auajor occupation in 
Ghana, accountf..na for the livelihood of over 60 percent of the worktna 
population. Eleven percent of the farmer• grow cocoa. The econoatc 
dOllinance of thia crop, Ghana'• leading aport cc:amodity, u the aain 
reuon for the di'ftrailication of the econOllly. Ghana is the vorld'• 
74 
lars••t •upplier of cocoa; - ·one-third of the world'• entire aupply of 
cocoa cOIMa from Chana. 
It 1.11 utiaated that about 80 percent of the capital atock in Ghana 
conabte of inveetment in conatruction and cocoa. Capital iavaatment in 
cocoa bu enabled the country to taka a high place among the underdeveloped 
countTie• in tenu of .E!t capita national income (ae well •• capital atoclt 
.2.t! capita) and 1.nveatment in construction ha.a 1ucceeded 1n providina th• 
country with an infTa-etructure which 1• advanced even by the atandarde 
of eome of the developed countriea. 
Such a one-crop econOlll)' ie obvioualy an obatacl• to induatrial 
grovth, and alwaya ia eubject to market fluctuation.a, a potential aource 
of financial inatability. Ghana re1olved to break thia financial depend-
ence on the coc~ market by broadening the nation'• economic hue. (It 
DW8t be noted that the infra1tructure of Ghana ia capable of aupporting 
econOllic activity far above the level pre1ently attained. Moreover, the 
quality of the managerial and adminiatrative ma.ehinery which Ghana po1e•H•1 
ie of a relatively high etandard ; the quality of the 1enior civil ••rvice 
1a high alM1 compare• well with that of the developed countri.e•--tbat la 
a fact which ia ao.cepted by all thoee who hne had much to do with the 
Ghana Senior Civil Service. Unfortunately, the aame tribute cannot be 
accoTded the junior civil aervice. In coaaerce Ghanaiana hold important 
manaaerial and adminiatrative po1t1 in both domeatic and foreign enter-
pri1e1.) The fir•t 1tep in diveraifying the economy vaa to determine 
what resource• the country could develop and what the 1equence ahould 
be for long-term 1u1tained grOllth. 
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One of the buic mea•uremenu of any nation'• econ<Jalic well-being, 
productivity and •trength 18 the amount of ite power generation and. con-
•1,111ption, and the development of water reeoureea. Over the past 1even 
ye.are the pace of induatrialization haa been very rapid. But unfortunately. 
or of neceeaity, the Government haa been the large9t eingle body concerned 
with euch industrial progreH, becauae indigenous private enterpri•• haa 
been confined mainly to agriculture and lta aaeoeiated activities. The 
need for cheaper and increu~d volume of electric power for new and growing 
induatriee haa been diacuaaed aeveral tfae• over the put two decadH. 
Thu qain, although Ghana ia often regarded aa a well watered country. 
the problem of conHrvation and utilization hae always been of .. jor 
1aportance everywhere except, perhaps, in acme part. of the forest zone 
vb.ere there ie little agricultural activity. In the dry seuon the sruter 
part of the cCM.ltry (etpe.ci.ally the northern 1avanna diatricta and acme 
co .. tal areu including the whole of the Accra Plaine) suffer• a chronic 
ehortqe of water for all purpoeee--notably water for domeetic use and for 
irrigation. Improved and greatly increutd volum of water auppliee are 
•••anti.al if those area• are to increase their population and agricultural 
activity. 
Thu•, after Ghana beccae independent in March, 1957 (it vu, prior 
to thia date, known .. the Gold Cout), the government called for new 
atudi•• of earlier British inveatigationa (1952 to early 1956) of the 
feu 1bility of conatructi.ng a dam and powerhOU8e on the Volta River. 
The Volta Project waa conceived ae a aasltipurpo•• acheme providing 
abundant hydroelectric power and allo water for the irrlgation of the area 
below and adjacent to the Volta IU.ver and the development of an inland 
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f iahing industry. '11lia project wo compared with some other project•, 
both multipurpose and a aerie• of eingle-purpoae pTOjecta, all of which 
bad the objective of "progreH in the development of Ghana's utural re• 
eourc••• induatry and agriculture.n These alternative project• were sub-
jected to formal quantitative analyai1 described in Part One. 
The Government of Ghana had long been convinced of the desirability 
of th• Volta atver Project; in February, 1959, an appraieal of all the 
alternative project• (with co1ta aa1eHed at current prices) saw the 
selection of the Volta River Project. The project vaa started in January, 
1962 by the hieer Engineer• of Oakland, California, U.S.A. and completed 
in January, 1966; firat cOlaercial power from the project waa produeed 
in August, 1965. 
To make the large hydroelectric power available from the project 
ecOllOll.ically feasible, it vaa e11ential th.at there be a consumer for a 
major block of the power generated. Studiea h~ indicated that thu point 
of the feaaibility could be met by construction of an altminiua nelter, 
an induatry which requires large amount• of power. Thia vaa to fon the 
nucleus of an integrated aluminium induatry utilizing hydroelectric power 
from the project to refine depo•ita of bauxite in the vicinity of Ako•Ollbo. 
1'he hydroelectric project and the aluminium smelter are financially eep-
arate. 'Die construction of the Valeo 8111elter at Tema wu begun in December. 
1964 and ia nearing completion now. 
The principal aource of revenue from the Volta River Project vill be 
1ala1 of pover. The demand for the power will come fre11 three group• of 
conaumere: the Valeo Smelter, the min.ea (Ghana baa a natural erulOWMnt 
of exploitable mineral depoeit1--gold, diamonds, manganeee and bauxite), 
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and the general public. The minimum revenue• from sale• of power to tlwa 
smelter are knovn with a high degree of .. aurance. since they are written 
into the power contTact signed by the Volta River Authority and Valeo. 
(The Volta AluminiUlll Company (Valeo), owner of the Smelter at Tem4, ia a 
partnership of two aluminium producer• headed by IC.aiaer Aluminium and 
Chemical Corporation of the United State• of America.) Under thi1 contract 
the AuthoYity ia obliged to make available. and Valeo ia obliged to con-
1ume or to pay for, certain minimun quant it ias of power. The aainimula 
qu.antitiee are specified for each yaar·-•tarting from the fir•t ye.ar of 
the ''Permanent I>eliveey Date", a date which in all probability seems to be 
April 1, 1967. The price at vhlch the power will be aold to the ••lter 
ia fixed for the firat thirty year• at 2.625 mills. equivalent to 0.187 
* peeewu , per kilowatt hour. Thu price is by arry- etandarde a cheap rate 
indeed; it f.a about one•ninth of the eatimated cost of producing power 
from the moat efficient of Ghana's preaent power atationa. '11\ua. although 
the ... 1ter demand was eaaantial to the viability of the hydroelectric 
project, becauae an alternative project of a dam vitb a eubatantially 
muller generating capacity would have much higher unit co1ta, very little 
direct prof it will be obtained froaa 1alea to the 81118lter--at leaat foT the 
f irat thirty year•. 
A large demand for power from consumer• other than the ••lter at 
remunerative price• 11 tbu1 eaaential to the hydroelectric project. The 
:taiaer Engineers' leuaes!!Q!nt Report of 19.59 calculated m.uimum md 
• A mill i• one•tenth of a U.S. cent. l peeeva • 1.40 cent• (U.S.). 
Nt 1.00 (one new cedi) • $1.40 (U.S. dollar1). 
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minimunl coat• of power delivered to the general public for domeetic and 
induatrial uses aa 7.12 aailla and 4.7S 1111111 reepectively. Baaed on 
estimate• of average daily demand for the Electricity Divisiont• powex· 
and the Reueeaament Report'! project;iona of put trend• in the comump-
tion of electricity in Ghana, Killick (58) aaaerte that revenue from ealea 
to other consumers i• expected greatly to exceed revenue• frca the amelter, 
even though for a long ti:!Qe the emslter will be taking the larger part 
of the total power generated at Akoeombo. He than sound• an optiJllistic 
note that "subject to the qualification that it i8 difficult to estiaate 
the growth of non-smelter power demand, there seems every reason to believe 
that the hydroelectric project will !n itself prove a wise inveatment. And 
thia 18 quite apart from 8IIY external econondes that it m.ay create" (58, 
p. 401). 
Water Uae 
Apart fTOm hydroelectric pow•r generation. •orae of the more 1-portlant 
alternative ua•• to which th• waters of the Volta Lake can be devoted are 
irrigation, inland tran•portation, recreation, fiahing and dcnastic and 
industrial water. Of theee uae1, irrigation and inland water traa.porta-
t1on ara receivina considerable attention of the Government of Ghana. 
Lake Tranaportation Survey and Accra Plaina Irrigation Survey vere under-
taken in 1965 and 1966 at the expenae of the government. 
Do1111Htic Uf• 
U•e of d011111•tic water hae grOVll eteadily over the p .. t decade and 
will keep on gTOWing ae the •tandard of living riae• for the counn-y aa 
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a whole. There ne wide variation• in domestic water use in different 
regions due to great regional lnequalitiee in terms of atandarda of living. 
Price has little effect on use 1ince water coet1 are normally mode1t and 
have minor constraints on use. 
In the cttie1 and towns the population 11 aerved with piped water by 
the Water Supplie• Diviaion. In the rui-al areas where there are no piped 
water eupplie1, the Water Supplie• Division provides clean water from 
wells, boreholes and ponds (principally from wells) under the Rural Water 
Supplie• Scheme. Ov'er the pa.et decade the number of piped water supplies 
ba1 increued 1teadily from 43 in 1957 to 119 in 1965. COlllParable figurea 
fOT other type• of water euppliee are: from 45 to 98 for ponds, from 
367 to 790 for borehole•, and from 2,915 to 3,833 fer wella. In 196S the 
total water production from Water Work• in the cOUl'l.try vaa 10,992 •illion 
gallona. The population 1erved by the Water Suppliee Division with piped 
water, ponds, borehole• and well• vaa eatimated at 2,537 thouaand in 1965. 
"Tbi8 ebowa that only 32 percent of the population waa aerved vith water 
by the Water Suppliea Division" (30, p. 86). Per capita municipal uae 
for citiH in the United State• variea from 50 to 500 gallons per day 
but of thie •oaae ii for indu1tr1al end commercial use. The 1965 figu~•• 
indicated that the average municipal use of water for the City of Accra 
wae of the magnitude of only 40 gallon• per capita per day. 
During the dry aU1111Der montha of July. Auguat and September there i• 
a ahortage of vater for domestic uae not only in the Accra municipality 
but also 1n the whole of the arid Accra Plains area. It might aeea that 
the low level of per capita coo1umption of domeatic water 11 due to lack 
of water auppU.ea facilities. However, notvithatandin.g the ahortqe of 
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domestic water during the SUJIIDCr months, one cannot offhand assert that 
domestic water demands will have a fortuitous phasing with dependable and 
improved •upplies, because the use is sometime• wasteful in some other 
mont hs . !bis phase of the problem requires detailed st~ies for each 
r egi on befor e intell i,gent water allocation to domestic uae can be made. 
In conclusion, the follCMing observation will be made; although the 
use of water for domestic needs will increase with populati on increase and 
a rising standard of living , there is no reason to expect any revoluti onary 
change in t he pet" capita consumption for domestic purposes . Consequently. 
the amount of water from the Volta Lake which will be allocated to domes tic 
use will not be of any substant ial magnitude at least withi n the next 
decade. 
Ind!,!!trial uae 
U•• of water for industrial venture• varw not only between product• 
but alao between differeut pl.anti producing identical products. The nature 
of the u•• ia variable and t he effect• of the u.ae on the vote vater may 
vary U.kewiae. A fw 1nduatrie1 1uch u the aoft-drink plmta and brev-
eriea actually uae water 1n their product•• aa we ll a in proce11f.ng. The 
two u.jor f.nduatrial u••• of water are for ccm.demer water and in unu-
facturing p-roc•••••. In the latter uae. there ie a wide range . P'or 
exaapl•• a canning plant may need only wa•h water, while paper mill• require 
larse CIOUllt• of water to 1u1pend pulp f iber 1 and 1teel mill• may require 
l arge amount• of water to quench and de1ca l e t he at ee l in rollia,g mill. 
Induetrial uae of water 11 . therefore, a compl u matter and cannot be 
ea.a Uy defined. It is cus tomary to use wat er ci rcula ted per manufactured 
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unit •• a meuure of induatrial water u.e•. Aa aeen above, the praaent 
water uae ia very am.all indeed. 
With rupect to future indu.etrial water uae, we find uncertainty of 
changing economic factor• to be a major effect on the ~ure uae patterna. 
The u1• of water in the future appear• certain to f.ncre.aae at a greater 
rate than the level of indu•trial production. Conatderation of future 
induatrial water me cannot be divorced from that of the aeleetion of 
induatrie• that (a) might profitably locate in the f.nduatri.al aouthern 
Ghan& which u expected to absorb molt of the water allocated for indu.-
tri.al purpo•ea, (b) would utiU . .ze the rav materiala produced in the coun-
try, and (c) would abaorb a maximum of the available working force. It 
ii difficult, if not impoHibla, to adhere to all three of the above 
principle•. Por inatance, 1ome induatriea that would utilize Ghana'• 
natural r••ourcea may require large quantitie1 of water and employ rel-
atively fev people, while other lndu.etriea would employ a luge nwaber 
of people, require a 11.inJaal allOUllt of water and utilise very little of 
our natural r••ourc••· With due con•ideration for tbe effect of variou 
pattern. of induatrial water uae on Groaa National Product, and coauider· 
ins the fa.ct that probleu of unemployMnt and undereaployMnt are real 
in Ghana, the Seven-Year Devaloi-ant Plan gave preference to induatriea 
that would ab•orb the growing labor force and that would require 1ae 
ainimm ..aunt of water for indu.etrial purpoH•. Among the 1ndu1trial 
group• •elected for 1tudy in developina the pattern. Mntioned above are 
food and kindred product•, textile aill product1; •twe, clay and 11.aa1 
product•, and electrical machinery and equip.ant. Tbua, th• au.epended 
SeYen•Year DeveloJJ119nt Plan intended to pur1ua the following "five 
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illportant ecoooaic objective•" to achieve the goal mentioned above: 
tt(a) To the lara••t dearH poHil>l• dm9etic aubatitut•• ahould 
be produced for tho•• manufactured ataplea of cOIUlu.er de• 
aand for vhoae aupply Ghan.a i• now entirely dependent on 
foreip. aourc•• and upend• l•ra• amw in foraip exchana• 
each year. 
(b) Tba qricultural and minina c~iti•• that are at pneant 
exported ao1tly a• unproceeaed prtaary product• ahould be 
prosre••i"9ly proce•••d and manufact~ before export. 
(c) The buildina .. terial• induatry ahould be expanded and 
mdemiucl to enable it to aupport the inevitable increued 
activity ill comtruction and a •tart abould be ud• on the 
deyeloi-n.t of other boic 1ndW1triea 1n the field of •tall 
and cheaic.all. 
(d) In the developmnt of boic induatrie• particuln attention 
ebould be paid to prepar1ng the econ~ for further at ... • of 
tndW1triaU.aatian eavuqed under aubeequent plan.a . A 
1>e1innina ahould therefore be made in a nall way in the 
field of machine indW1tria•, electrical equipment and elec-
tron ice. 
(•) Induatrie• will be developed in auch a vay that they fit in 
vitb clevelopmi1n.t in other African countrie•" l 
In late February, 1966 there vaa a change-over of Adainietration in 
Ghan.a. Tba nev Mllinutration charged the old r•11- vith, inter .!!!!. 
Plan which, it vu alleged, "axuted only in um durtq th• year (1965) 
and it vu no wonder that the S • .5 percent taraet rate of arowth for the 
econc:.y it contatna proved to be an unattainable rate in 196.5 . Quit• 
apart fr• the fact that gOYerumnt expenditure vu running at a level 
aach htaher than u indicated in the Plan, the compoaition of thu up&ndi· 
ture ••• alao terribly out of tune with the Plan eatimatea. • •• All the 
1 
Seven-Year Development Pl.an 31. p. 93. 
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effort• (by the new ~f.nlatration) to atabiUse the ece>llOlq have reaulted 
in an incnu• f.n unempl07"Mnt levela. Thia abould 1ive the goven:.ant 
acme worry u it po••• both a political and a aocial problem. TM ...v 
buqet of the Adaf.niatration make• proviaion for a number of labor•inteutw 
project• which can go a lona way to ainf.111•• th• unemplo,-nt probl•" 
(30, pp. 105-106). It ia not difficult to infer from the•• pronounc ... nta 
that the new Adaf.nlatration will very likely be pitted f.n their tnduatrial 
prop'• by the "five blportant econmic objective•" outlined abov., and 
that 1n cue of any •Jor deviation• frca the•• "object ivea 11 it la not 
unreuonable to uatma that the uv emphula will be put on tnduatrte1 
which will 10 a long way to aolving the probl ... of unmaploy111111t and 
under-.plo,.ent vbil.a requlriq 1-8 lai.ntaa amount of water for induatrial 
purpo•••· 
Mineral reaourcea of preaent known econcaic illportance found 1n 
Ghana are aold, dtawwt, bauzite and manganeae. All theae ainerala u 
well u atone, aand and aravel are 1n active pToduction. Scaa other 
ai.nerala which an known to abt in Ghana, and an likely to come into 
production within the foreHeable future are clay, berylllm, iron ad 
white 11- (cf. lillick, 57). Sand·arnel and atone are b•lna uploited 
by the local buildina induetry. Clay auitable for brick-uld.na and 
pottery ia found 1n aany part• of the country, but th••• (eapecially 
brick-..akiq) will becm. of 1-portance only when heavy tnduatrte1 becGM 
ti.. order of the day, or cheap tranaportatioa becClll81 available. A aore 
recent and unezploited diacOYery ta the large depoait of iron ore near 
Sbtesie in the 1'orthen reaion. Th• future of iron apparently liu with 
the increued activity of the coutructlon f.ndwatrlaa and cb9ap 
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tranaportetion. Tll• Shiene iron ore field• ia vithin reach (only 30 mile• 
away) of the Volta Lake and thua vater tran1portation 1a poHible for th• 
product• of &llJ mine that might be conetructed there. Beryllium probably 
will be the laat of the minerall to be exploited. It neverthale11 con-
•titutea a valuable aource of imparting great strength and reeiatance to 
fatipe to alloy• vith aluminium and iron which are producible in GhanA. 
Mining operation.a and llineral proce••ina. however, do not require 
lar1e amount• of water. Por moat open pita water 11 required only for 
cooling radiator• on internal combuation e.ng1ne1 and for dcae1tic use. 
In large open pit mine• water u required for churn or rotary drilling. 
Underground mining operatioua require conaiderably more water than open.-
pit ainina becauae of the nece11ity to reduce duat. All drilling undar-
around i• done vet; that 11, a 1traaa of water i1 kept on the drill bit. 
After blaetina, the broken rock it 1prayed with water to reduce the duat 
hazard . Tba -.ount of water comumed underground variea within wide 
liait1, but on the whole the avaraae ff.aur• for the vol~ of water per 
ton of ore a1nad ia vary .ull indeed. ProceH lng of or•• generally n-
quiru large qu.antitie1 of water in ccaparuon to tho1a required for 
mining operation•. 
Hence , aa greater emphu ia ii placed upon "proar••• ive ly proce11 ing 
and u.nufacturina" our agricultural and mining c~itie1 before uport, 
the induatrial water demand can be expected to increue Tety aharply • 
,.rcentqe-viae. However, it wmat be noted that water uae• for industrial 
purpo1ea have developed in an environment of relative abundance of water 
and uaea have been very 1eneroue. In the future• 1uch uaea will ••• 
va1teful and •• can anticipate more n1trictive uae1. Tak in& into 
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couideration the abcwe analyaia of aanufacturin,g and ainina tnduetriea, 
it ..... doubtful if tbil percentage 1.Dcreue f.n deaand for induatrlal water 
can be tranalated to any aubatantial increaae in the vol\llllt of water aoing 
into iuduatrt..l venturea. Conaequ.ently, at JAat 1n the foreaeeabl• future, 
the 8llOUl\t of water frOlll the Volta Lake allocated to tnduatrial uae vill 
not be of any aignlf icant magnitude. 
Jlecnation 
In Chan.a ncnation buatne11 u atill in ita infUCJ and u nry 
... 11, in term of via1tora to public ncnatioa areu. But vith a 
riaina R!X capita incw and vith an f.ncreued activity of the Ghana 
Tourt.at Board, th• demand for all type• of outdoor recreational activiti•• 
1a Ubly to iDcnue anatl)' in the ccatng decade--vitb deund for fuh• 
tna and nt-tn.a takilag pnoeclence. Then 1.a therefore a great aeed for 
the Ghana T~iat Board to cordf.nat• and aid ta the plannf.na md uae of 
outdoor recreation activiti.ea. At preaent tba data &eC\D&lated by the 
loard an very abtchy and f.ncoh4tnnt. It u hoped that in the MU 
future th• Board will be able to prcwld• auch buic data u ncreational 
!Haufit• (ta term of eedf.a per vf.aitor-day) to be ued in c011parina the 
cNt• for 4eterainatiOll of ecoaCldc juatif ication of propoaed recreatioul 
d .... lopmnta, ad alao the nml>er of vf.aitora (per a unit period, • ., a 
year) to th• varloua recreatioaal ared. 
All •ntionad elewbere, recreation ha. beco. a bla butiM•• tn Glum.a. 
Water recreation actlvitiea are cv.rrentl7 confined to the coutal areu 
(a.a., lUriwa leach, near Cape Coaat, and Labadi Buch mar Accra) and 
Akoeombo. the aoutMl.'IDl>4lt tip of the Volta Lab. Water recrutiaa 
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activiti•• are expected to be on the increue in the future but thia will 
have very little effect cm water uae. 
An important queation that come1 to mind ia whether the traditional 
1natitutioua of aupply, demand and ma.rut pricing ayetem can be depended 
upon to aerve H a buie for allocating water to recreation. 'lhia ia a 
valid queatlon becauae with growth in urban populatiOD. md per capita 
incc.e, and the reaulting graving demand for outdoor recreation, ''what 
vu once virtually free for the aaking--•·I·• ace••• to a deairable fiaht.na 
atr•---h nov in incnuingly abort aupply" (cf. Wollman 110, p. 220). 
Whereu the induatriel u.aer of water b a well-defined penoaal or cor-
porate entity that can protect the vital rmr aateriall of it• activity, 
the recreational "tnduatry" ia diaoyganiaed and itaelf deplete• very little 
water. A. Wollman putl it, for the moat part, it ie not the buaineHlUD 
in the "indotry" but the ultimate cooaumer who aaka• con.tact with water. 
'11ie intereat of the lnduatry in an adequate water aupply u, therefore, 
more indirect than th.at of faTmr or proce11or, even though vater may 
be ju.at a• eaaantial for the induatry'• welfare. "Becauae of tbia indirect 
nature and the fact that the recreation induatry ia, in fact, compoHd 
of a vide variety of tradea, aervicea and govemMnt facilitiu, no well-
deff.ned uaer intereat--a:capt that of th• conaumer biaaelf--cm readily 
be mobilised. ror thia reaaon one aight eu.apect that in order to provide 
for an allocation of water to recreation that giv•• due conaideration to 
the 'demand', •a.e public or public-prbate arrangement aay be required, 
the rationale of which ia not directly derived from private, markat-price 
proc•••••" (Wollaan 110, p. 2.21). 
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Water tran•portation 
One of the potential benefita of the Volta Lake is that of inland 
water tran•portation or navigation. Technically there i• no major 
difficulty but economically the viability of euch water transport system 
will depend on the voluine of traffic. Becau•• of great regional inequal-
ities , there 1• at preeent a very limited flor.ir of good• between the North 
and the South. Iillick (S8) baa augge1ted that a tDAjor expan11on of North-
Soutb trade will occur if the iron ore deposit• at Shiene in the Northern 
region were found to be worth exploiting. l1le ob1ervation hae a.ho been 
made that many of the new cOUJaJnitiea on the 1bore of the lake will de• 
velop into pro1peroua f11hing and trading centera. Law-cost water tran•-
portation will, obviously, play an important role 1n the development of 
both development•--prov1di13.1 dependable and cheap transportation of the 
iron ore• to the South for proce11ing, and al10 providing ace••• to a 
broad trading area for the inland fishing indu1try. 
Engineering and preliminary de•ign has been undertaken by the K.ai••r 
Engineer• for •tructure• and facilitie1 that would be required foT a 
pa.1enger and cargo tran1port 1y1tem. on the Volta Lake. and a Lake Trarus-
portation Survey va1 conducted by the government to 1tudy all transport 
system from the lake dOWtUtt'eam to the cout. The survey waa not only an 
exerciae at deteraaining the feasibility of the water tran.port project 
but also an attempt to determine where the proposed inland port• of the 
Volta Lake are to be located. It i• needle•• to say that any policy 
intended to reduce regional inequalitie1 or etimulate trade frOll the South 
to the Northern region• of Ghana and thence into Upper Volta au•t take 
into account water trant1portation on Lake Volta--1ub1idizing 1uch a 
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transport ayste:m, if neceaaary. 
The new Administration has committed itaelf to developing the Volta 
Lake water tranaport system and work 1a to begin soon. It therefore ••eu 
clear that a considerable amount of water of the 120-million-acre-feet-
capacity Lake Volta will be devoted to water tranaportation. 
Irrigation 
The poaaibility of drawing water from the Volta Lake to irrigate the 
areaa below and adjacent to the Lake baa been the aubject ot a good deal 
of invutigation. The two principal atudiee were undertaken by the Pood 
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nationa and the Kaiaer Bngi-
neera. Bacauae of the fairly heavy capital coau involved, the irrigation 
atudie• have ao far been confined to the relatively arid and potentially 
aore productive aoil• of the Accra Plaina. It ia hoped that aa the 
financial poaition of the econoary f.aprove• the adjacent areaa of Ro-Xeta 
Plaina and ~pandu diatrict will also be brought under irrigation. 
The loweat rainfall valuea in Ghana for any particular year are "-
corded over the Accra Plaina with the capital (Accra) itaelf having an 
average annual rainfall of only 28 incha1. Since 1960 aome uperimenta 
have been conducted on the black aoil of the Accra Plain• to determine 
the feaaibility and adviaability of an irrigation acheme for the area and 
alao to determine what crops are beat auited to the aoU conditions. One 
aucb pilot acheme (the Dawhenya Dara Project) proved to be a great aucceaa 
with 500 acr•• of rice. In the laat couple of yeara the State Sugar 
Product• Corporation, in an attempt to incr•••• ite activity, aponeored 
a reaearch project on the plaina and the reault waa aatoniehingly good. 
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Modest aucce•••• have aleo been recorded in experiment• with other crop1--
thia wa1 done to replace the high 1tarch food• of .. be and caHava which 
enjoy natural 1-mity in the plaina vith more hi&hly profitable crop1 &1 
vegetablea, cotton, tobacco and fruit•. 
Both the PAO and the l.aieer Engineer• Studt.a agreed on the technical 
fea1ibility of the Accra Plaine irrigation project--it would be poeaible 
to takAt off froaa the Volta Lake a auff icient volume of water to irrigate 
the plaina without reducing the power generating capacity of the dam. 
The Accra Plains irrigation 1cheme ia likely to affect the agricultural 
econamy in vaya c011parable to that of the bydropower development. under 
the 1ch ... , an irrigation 1yatea ha• been designed by th• IC.aiaer !ngin••r• 
(though n.ot yet couetructed) to bring water freq Lake Volta and tlul Volta 
River to the Accra Plains. When coapleted, the Accra Plaine project will 
ec.able Ghana to produce major quantitiea of induatrial ra1 material• for 
the local induetriea--cotton and 1ugarcane--and will provide an abundant 
aupply of conaumer ataplea, including rice, other graina, vegetable• 
and citrus fruit•. A reconnaiaance atudy by Levi1 G. S•ith (done on behalf 
of th• Volta B.iver Authority) indicated that a fin8DCially profitable 
ecb ... of irri&atlon would be poaaible at a capital coat of Ne 51.6 aUUoo 
or $72.24 ailliou (92). The Saith report utiaatea that the aanual value 
of the rice crop ahould exceed the total coet and, at 30,000 tone a year, 
would greatly reduce the country'• need to import thia food. 
The relative dryneea of the Accra Plains require• aom c~ot. The 
Accra Plains caver• an ar•• of about 935 aquare ailee; it utenda u a 
atrip about 1' ail•• wide frOlll 6 mil•• weat of Accra to the vicinity of 
Ada. (It 1• ••parated from the Ho-Keta Plains, to the ea1t, by the Volta 
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IUver--1ee Figure 5). The Accra Plains make up the vegetation •one known 
u the Coutal Savanna Gru1land--'vith a variable development of thicket 
1crub and 1cattered trees" (Lane, 1957). In the wHtern part of the plain• 
gra.aland with clump• of potentially evergreen thicket is typical; thia 
area haa an average annual rainfall of about 3S inche•. However, the 
eaatern part of the plains coaaprising about 700 aquare milea (or about 
450,000 acre1) bu an average annual rainfall of only about 30 inchH-· 
the lowe1t in the country. It 11 thia eutern part of the Accra Plains 
(eut of Accra and Aburi) that will be covered by the irrigation ache•. 
The principal feature• of rainfall in thia region, aa i1 the ca1e all 
over Ghana, are it• 1euonal character and ita variability fTom year to 
year. The averaae diatribution of rainfall during the year does not 
vary much over the area--froa about 3.5 inches in the weat to about 28 
inch•• in the eaat. Theta averaa• figure• are low compared with the na-
tional average figure of between 40 and 70 tnchea. 'nle average annual 
rainfall ii greateat in the Weatern region where Eaimu (near Axim) haa 
an average of 86 inch••. The 1eaaonal variability is more pronounced for 
other areaa than for the Accra Plain.a area. The aeuonal d11tribut10D 
and it• variability for typical atationa are illu.trated in Figure 6. 
(Compare the aeaaonal diatributiona of Axim in the Weit, Xumaai in the 
central area, Accra in the Accra Plain• area, and Ro to the Eaat.) Mo1t 
of the central and 1outhern parts of the country have two clearly defined 
rainy ••••one, the principal reaching it• aaxiraulll in May and Jwie and the 
1ub11d1..try in October. Though thia affects the whole coa1tal plain, yet 
in the Accra Plaine the 1ub1idiary aeaaon ii 1carcely in evidence. 
January ia a dry 1110nth throughout the country, but the driest month in the 
! 
Pigure 5. The Volta Lab 
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Accra Plain• b Augu.t. 'lbia account• for the "chronic ahortage of water" 
daring the 1..-er month• in the capital, Accra, and ita environ•. Th• re-
ault of ae .. on.al var1atiol18 ia variability in monthly rainfall total• and 
alao in yearly totala . Jigure 6 preaenta value• of the medimi 11110nthly 
rainfall totala, the greateat and leut value• recorded in each B>Uth and 
the quartile value•. It will be noted that, wtiUe June in the aouthern 
part of the country ia expected to be wet vf.th average monthly value• 
between 6 and 10 incbe1, value• at Accra range from 24 inch•• to jut under 
5 inches. 
The 1avmina graaaland of the Accra Plains i• one of the lea1t-farmed 
region. of the country, the grualand bef.na mainly uaed for gruing of 
cattle. The black aoila do not support good gruing land, water auppU.u 
are hard to obtain and the aoila are extremely difficult to cultivate with 
the hoe. '11le reault ia that the land they underlie ia practically unuaed 
except for occuf.onal gruing when nearby srualand hu been overarued. 
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CHAPTER 7. MODELS FOR WATllt BISOORCBS ALLOCATION 
Introduction 
Efficient utili.Eation of th• water reaourc•• within a river •y•t .. 
require• a knowledge of the net aocial benefite derived from varioua 
quantiti•• of water allocated to each of th• uny potential uaere. 'ftle 
difficulti•• in quantifying the•• benefit function• have already been 
diacuaeed in Part One. For further dbcueeion, Mclean (74) and !cbtein 
(21) are •usa••t•d. 
The Volta River Project, when fully completed, will take on the 
character of a hf.ahly developed rt.er ayatea, in that the water levela in 
the re•ervoira, the flow• in the atruu and can.ale and the quantity of 
water allocated to each of th• many water u••• can be at leut partially 
controlled. '111• oper.ation of the many control atructuree in auch a way 
aa to beet eatiafy all th••• demand• poeea a probl ... 
Probl ... of allocation often involve the aimultaneoua determination 
of a nUllber of variable•. Con.aider the allocation of the water• of Lake 
Volta. .lecau•• of the ••••on.al variation of rainfall over all reaiou in 
Ghana, the -.,unt of water in the lab will obTioualy vary from Haaon to 
eeuon. We alao have a number of alternative uaea to which thb water can 
be put, each uae having different aeaaonal requir .. nta. '11l• probt .. 
hare ta that of aelectina th• beat alternativa•;--tbat 18, the determlna· 
tion of the eolution of the •ariabl•• which yield• the ar•ateat product 
or inca.a from th• given volw. of water. If there were no poaitive inter· 
action between the variable•, an "optimm" aolution would eventually be 
found by conaecutively holding all variable• conatant but one, each time 
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calculating incremental (or marginal) coat• and return•. Howev•r, moat 
planning aaenci•• do not hav• auff icient reaourcea for thia laborious 
procedure. 
Activity analyaia appear• proaaiaina aa an aid in water reaourcee 
allocation, in view of the large number of interdependent variable• that 
uy be involved. The aoat important opttaisation technique developed in 
the field of activity analyaia la linear proar-ing, a method which 
attempt• to pTeecribe optiaua cour•e• of action for a given (linear) 
objective. The general problem of linear progr.,.tng ta the 1earch for 
the optiama (miniam or maxiaa) of a linear function of variable• con-
•trained by linear relation9 (equationa or inequalitie1) called re1traint1. 
Two linear proaraaing modela are diacuaaed tn this thel1.a. The 
f ir1t corre1pond1 to the preaent eituation in which the principal dell&llda 
tor water are for electricity generation and irrigation of only one area, 
the Accra Plain1. Irrigation of the area adjacent to the lake t.. not 
con1idered here; the llllOUllt of water for da•Htic uaea 1a taken aa a 
* conatant; no proviaion ii aade for otur u•e• of water (cf., diacut1eion 
of Chapter 6). 
The eecond model ii a Mthod for detemlnina rational water-alloca-
tion policiea when the Volta lliver Project u fully completed and 1a 
functioniPg •• a "highly developed" river 1yet•--vith all the fixed 
phy1ical plant (e.g., reeervoira, dama, power planta, irrtaation canala, 
etc.) completed and operating. Thi.a model thu1 abstracta from fixed 
• Induatrial u•e• of water, water for recreation, and uaee by fiah are 
amall in relation to the agricultural ues of water. 
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capital coeta and allow• for eeveral con1umptiva uae1 of water in the Volta 
river 1y1tem. Consumptive use, in thi1 context, meane any uae that makes 
water unavailable for other ueere. 
The policy objectives of the two modela, while remaining euentially 
the 1ame (that is, efficient utili%ation of the water re1ource1 among the 
u.er1), give riae to different objective functiona. 
Model I 
The obtectiva function 
The capital coat• aaeociated with alectrlclty generation (that ia, 
the buildina of the Volta Dam and power plant at Ako10llbo) vill not be 
introduced into the function 1ince the•• coatl cannot be manipulated. 
The capital coata of building the reeerYoir 1l to capacity Z and the 
irTigatioll ayateaa to capacity I aillion acre-feet (a.a.f.) 1>9r year, 
however, while alao are given data, mu1t be introduced into the objective 
function 1ince the.ea capital coat• are yet to be incurnd. The total 
amount of vater removed for irri&ation of the Accra Plain.a 1a denoted by 
I, and B denote• energy generated in any period (t • l, 2, ••• , SO yeara) 
in thouaanda of kilowatt hour• (ll:wh). 
The objective function ia given by 
where 
B1 (!) ia the praeent value of an output of I kvb 1>9r year, in 
aillioo.a of cedi• (Nt), 
B2(1) ia the pre•ent value of an irrigation aupply of I a.a.f. 
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per ,..ar, in aillion• of Rt, 
It(Z, I) 18 the total capital coat of building reaervoir B. to 
capacity Z and the irrigation 1y1t• to capacity I, 
in ailliona of Nt. 
i(z, I) bu been ••tillated and fixed (a given datU11) at • 51.6 million. 
Tb• benaf it t•l'1111 (aroa• of capital coat1) are obtained •• the pre1ent 
value of the annual net benefit. A8ewaing an average ducount rat• of 
2\ percent, we obtain a vreeent value factor of 28 .4 for the •••Ulll8d 50 
yeara life of the project--tbat u, the preaent value of a nat benefit of 
!ft 1.00 per year for fifty 1•an 18 Mt 28 .40. 
1
1 
(I): The price at which the power will be aold to the Valeo 
aluainiwa ... 1ter ia ftsad for the firat thirty year• at 2.625 mill.I 
(or 0.187 puevu) per kilowatt hour, vbil• "a rate of 10 ailb (or 0.715 
pe1ft'u) per kilowatt hour ta a11\mlled for non-1Mlter con.au.tr•" (Eillick 
58, p. 398). The aroaa benefit then ia 
aillion• of cedu, "here E ia the ~t of power avaUable to the • 
.. 1ter. Operating and aainteunca coau are taken u 0.002.E. We, 
therefore, obtain annual net benefit froa electric power u 
and the preaent valua of electric power operation• i• 
B1(1) • (0.00515! - 0.0052811
) x 28.40 
• 0.146! - O.l.50B • 
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The amount of power available to the melter, ! • ie known (cf. The White • 
Paper No. 1 of 1961, 32, p. 22). 
B
2
(I): The marginal value of irrigation water 11 not conatant. We 
•••ume the aarginal groaa benef 1t to be of the form 
in cedia per acre-foot, where a , t3, and c are knam para1Mtera. Intearat-
1ng tbi.a form O to I, we obtain the total gTO•• benefit in ailliona of 
cedia u 
a I + c: ' log ( 1 + 13 I) , c' ~ c • 
Subtracting operating and saaintenance cotta of µ 1, we obtain an annual 
net benefit of 
a' I + c' log(l + 13 I) , a' • a - µ 
µ i• a parameter, 
which yield• a preaent value of irrigation water of 
The objective function can thua i,. written as 
(1) 
The conatraint• 
n • 0.146B - O.l.50E + 28.40o'I • 
+ 28.40c' 109(1 + t3 I) - 51.6 • 
'l'be year ia broken up into two aeaaooa: the wat rainy aeaaoo and the 
dry ••uon. Figure 7 ahoPJra the •An flow• in the two aeaaooa in million 
Separated 
For Purposes 









W - Y - P 
D + Y -P 
z 
)W - Y - P - Z 
Lo-Y ... P-r-Z 
Figur e 7 . A simp l ified Volta River system 
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acre-feet, with the wet season flow written above the dry eeaeoo flow. W 
ia the amount of wat8r flowf.n,g into Lake Volta frOlll the many tributariee 
of the Volta ll1ver during the wet eeuon, and D 1• the inflow during tba 
dry 1euon. The amount of water flowing into the Volta Lake in the tvo 
aeaeona (W and D) • the amount of water for do1111Htic consumption (P), •• 
well a• the cal)aclty (Y) of the now-completed da, are all given data. 
We aeeume that 40 percent of I ia requi.Hd during the rainy teuon and 
60 percent in the dry eeuon. We also ae•ume there b no aignificant 
inter•aeuonal variation in energy conawaption, 10 that half the energy 
gellat'&ted will be con.a\Dld in the wet eeaeon and half in the dry ••Hon. 
(2) 
The policy coutral.nte are given u (•ee Figure 7): 
w - y 








w - y - p - z - 0.40 1 
D + Y - P + Z • 0.60 1 
I, Z > 0 
We uaume • linear technical relationship between flow and eneray output 1 
(3) ! - >.. ., 
where I denote• energy aenerated in any period in kvb; F denotes flow 
through the turb inu in m. a. f. in the •SM peTiod. under the u1gapt ion 
that half the energy b conaumad in wet Huon and half in dry eeuon, 
the policy con.atratnta for energy generation are: 
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w - y > .Q.:.l B > y+M E < w ).. >.. 
(4) .2.:S > -Y+~ D + Y > B E < D >.. >.. 
Model 11 
'11lb model concern• itaelf with the formil.ation of operatina policiea 
for an already developed river ayet•. I have uaumad a ayetut dealgn in 
which target• are wall utabliahed-•i.e., each ue•r know• u.actly the 
qwmtity of water he will receive during each tfM period durina the year. 
U1ar• plan their activiti•• expecting to ~•ive th••• tara•t allocation. 
but at the .... time realt.ai.Qa that becauae of the uncertainty of inflon 
W and D, their actual allocation aay be greater or le•• th.m their target. 
An optimal operating policy ta, therefore, likely to be that which raini-
•isu the total lo•••• aaaociated with any deviation from the taraet alloca-
tiou. 
The ob1ective function 
Buraa (10) bu COl18tructed two net benefit functlona for trriaated 
lad in California. More recently, Rufachmidt and Jierina (48) have 
developed ll&llY benefit function.a for domeatlc and 1ndU8trial water auppli•• 
and for hydroelectric power in the Lehigh River Bain 1n Penuylvania. 
Mau,.!!..!!· (69), Mctcaan (74), DoTfman (17), Kauo (56), Ciriac:y-Wmtrup 
(13) and Wollman (110) have alao diacuaaed aome method• of con1tructing 
th••• benefit functiona. Loucb (68) cona1der1 l'igure 8 u a "plausible 
net benefit function": aaaociated with thia b a loaa function (Figure 9) 
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Figure 9 . Net loss function 
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line" going through the point B.r• where ~ 1a the level of benefit• achieved 
when the actual allocation equab the target allocation. In Figure 8, the 
benefit• are near a maximml at the target allocation. A flood or drought 
relative to the target allocation will often decrease the benefit• re• 
ceived. An allocation of A unite of water would reduce the expected net 
b•nefite by ~ - BA. The benefit• occurring frm a zero alloc•tion, B
0
, 
may be negative (u ahown) or poaitive. A decreaae in the Rpe"cted net 
benefit• repreeenta a loaa to the water uaer (meuured in 110nay terma, 
cedia). For a fa111 firm the loae •ight repreaent the deer• .. • in profit• 
reaulting from underproduction or frOll flood d-.age. For aany other 
induatriea (e.g., manufacturing, recreation, water trmaportation) the 
loH f ram water ahortage would be the coat of doing without the water or 
obtaining water elaewhere, whichever is lesa. The leut coatly alternative 
un be expr••••d u a function of the allocation. The alternative coat or 
loaa function 1a of th• ehape ahown in Figure 9. 
U the actual allocation is o-A, then the reduction in benef ita 
B.r - BA in Figure 8 equala the loaa 0-LA in Figure 9. The uaer'• target 
* will be eo.IVbere in the region of no loHee • i.e., between a and b in 
Figure 9. 
AllllOat all the usea to which th• waters of Lake Volta will be put--
irrigation. power.generation. recreation, fishing, water transportation, 
llUllicipal conaumption (SO, 58)-·have convex loaa functioaa aiJlilar to 
* Negative loaeea ar• not conaidered. 
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The problem DOW' is to express the objective function mathematically 
and then minimize the total net loeaee. Let the subscript u denote a 
* particular consumptive use in the river 1yetem (u•l, 2, ••• U). Let the 
subscript r represent a particular reservoir in the river aystem (r•l, 2, 
. . . !) . 
We now linearize the loss function associated with any particular use 
within the rivet' aystem in Figure 10. The •lopes of the linear aegmente, 
Lutj represent the net loea per unit of water within aegment j allocated 
to use u in period t. L t , therefore, repreaente the net loaaea reault-
u 0 
tng from an allocation of a zero quer>.tity of water to uae u tn period t. 
Mutj ia the maximum quantity of water that can be allocated to all eegJDenta 
up to and including aegment j within period t. Thu. Mut2 represents the 
maximum amount of water that can be allocated to aegJmnts 1 and 2. Let 
Nut be the maximum number of loaa~function aegment• j for uee u in per iod 
t. Replacing aubacTipt u with aub1cript r, we obtain aimilar notations for 
any reservoir r. Theae notation• repreeent given data, in that, since we 
are dealing with a ''highly developed" river eyatea. the total number of 
conat.aptive uaea (U), the total number of re•ervoir• (R) ae well u the 
number of •egmenta Rut (for coneumptive ua••) and •rt for re•ervoir• are 
all known . Similarly foT Mutj and Mrtj " 
The variable• Ol' unlm.owlus are: 
~tj • the quantity of water within segment j allocated to use u in 
period t, and 
• We now coll8ider 3 different kind• of irrigation proj.cta: IA r•p-
reeente irrisation of Accra Plains, 1a repre1ent• irrigation of Bo-Xeta 
Plaine, 'Ix repruentl irrigation of ~pandu and adjacent area. Bach 


















Mut2 Mut3 Mut4 
QUANTITY OF WATER 
Figure 10 . Line arized net loss fun ction 
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Srtj • the quantity of water within •eam-nt j etored in reaervoir r 
in period t. 
therefore, the total quantity of water allocated to uae u in any 
period t ... 
(5) 




s - l: srtj 
rt j•l 
We encounter •080 difficulty in meuuring the net loss•• frOG a 
reaervoir r if th• final water •torap level j at the end of a period 
ia different from the initial level at the beginning of the period. 
Thu• if during a particular period t the iniU.al atorage were in ••.-zit 
j•2 and the final •toraa• in j•5. how do ve calculate the net lo•••• for 
period t? By u1in1 net lo•••• occurring at the beginnina of the period, 
at the end of the period, or aome average of th••• two loHea? For tbb 
reaaon, aome writer• (39, 68) divide th• period t into subperioda. Bare 
we divide period t into equal aubperiod• p: 
p - o, 1, 2, •••• p 
rt 
(p€t) 
where period t begina at aubperiod p-0 and end• at aubperiod p • Prt; the 
total number of aubperlod1, Prt ' will depend on th• reaervoir r and period 
t. 
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Let Srtjp be the quantity of water within ••a-nt j atored in raaarvoir 
r at the .!!!! of the aubperiod p (pr.t). Then 
(7) s -rt s rtjp 
The net lo•••• reaulting from the 8llOUDt 1tored in reaervoir r at 
the and of the aubperiod p ia: 
(8) 
"rt 
L+ • L + E 
r rto j•l 
L S rtj rtjp 
Therefore, the average net lo•••• during period t frOlll tha water 
atored in reaervoir r ia: 
(9) L • L + l 
r rto Prt + 1 L S rtj rtjp 
The lo•• function uaociated with energy produced by a hydroelectric 




L • L + E Letj Eetj , e eto j•l 
e • 1, 2, 3 
letj • electrical energy produced within ••a-nt j by plant • 
during period t. 
The net loea to any particular uae u ii deff.nad aiailar to equation 10. 
Tb• policy objective than u to minimize the total net loHea to all 
uaea u, all hydroelectri.c plant• • and all re1ervoira r over all period• 
t(t • 1, 2, ••• , T): 
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Minim.ii:• 
(11) 1 • I: E L + I: T { u ( Nut 
t•l u-1 uto j•l 
The con.traint• 
The f irat aroup of con•trainta c011pria•• the definition of the 
variable• ~t, S t and the quantity of water •tored in r•••rvoir r at 
r Nrt 
the and of •ul>period p, l: S tj • Equationa 5 and 6 are therefore 
j•l r P 
part of the policy comtrainu, and 
N t ~ s • ( initial atoraa•) + _p_ ( final atoraga ainua) 
j•l rtjp in period t Prt initial etoraa• 
(12) 
The eecond aroup of conatrainte etat•• that each allocatioa within 
••a-nt j cannot be greater than the aaxtma for that ees-nti 
(13) 
Q < M - H utj - utj u,t,j•l 
for all u. r, t, p, j; j # 1. 
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The third group of conatraint• are related to water allocation• and 
r•••rvoir rel•••••· The quantity of water allocated to any of the con· 
aumptive uea, ~t• cannot be greater than the amount Aut available for 
that uaer: 
(14) Q < A 
ut ut 
for all u and t. 
Where •ome allocationa ae eatabliahed by law, we inaert a coutraint 
guaranteeing at leut, ••1• Wut unit• of water to uae u in period t: 
(15) 
The quantity releued, Xrt• fro. any re•ervoir r durlng any period 
t cannot exceed the atorage at the end of the pnvioua period plut1 th• 
inf low• Irt, during the preaent period: 
(16) X < S +I rt - r,t•l rt 
and the r•••rvoir •torage, Srt' a~ the end of any period t cannot exceed 
the re••rvoir capacity, C : r 
(17) s t < c • r r 
for all r and t. Abo the •toraae at the beginning of period t plu th• 
net 1nflov ainua the rel••••• X t' mat equal the 1torage, S • at the r rt 




Pina Uy, ve conaider the hydroelectric power conatralnta. The main 
hydroelectric plant of the Volta River PTojaet ia •••ociatad with one 
reaervoir (the Ako•om1>o D•) md ia a fixed bead plant which draw water 
• at an average be1gbt of 213 feet above the Francia turbine•. The bead 
18 therefore a con•tant. However• it 1a planned to con1truct two more 
** power etationa. Let ua u1ume a linear technical relatioaahip between 
flow and ener17 output: 
(19) 
where 
B • It Q B 
et • et et • • - 1, 2, 3 
Bet • electric•l energy produced by plant e duriag period t. 
Jte • a coutant for effi.eieney and converaion of plant e. 
Qet • the flow throuah the turbine• of plant e during period t. 
Hat • average head above the turbine• of plant • during period t. 
* .Ueumi.ng a known average head• Bet, the conetrainta for power are eaa Uy 
recopised uz 
(20) 
(21) Q < x et - rt 
where reaervoir r is uaoci.ated with hydroelectric plant e. 
* Four 203,000-hp Francia turbine• are in uae nov (two more will be 
added u power demand grove). Duian operating head 1a 213 feet. 
** A power atatlon at ~ong (twelve ailH dowutre• fraa AkoaClllbo) 
will have a "net" capacity of 86,000 kilowatta. A smaller d• at Bui 
in the Brong•Ahafo region will have a capacity of 190,000 kilowatt• (SB). 
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Policy Ponaulation 
1'or Model I, the problem ia oae of maiaiaing the objective function 
l liubject to the conatraint8 of equationa 2 and 4. Since all the par-tera 
and ~•rt.able• are known data except for Z, I and E, the progr ... ing pTo-
bln 18 a Verf aiaple one. The aolution to the probla can be obtained by 
the ua• of a COllllpUter or by trial-and-error iterative method a~geated by 
Dorfman (17), whereby E and I are made funct101la of z. 
With reapect to the geueraU.1:ed Model II, th• prop"-tna probl• 
ia ooe of ainiaisation: ainfaiz• the objective function 11 8Ubject to the 
coutraiuu 5, 6, and 12 throuah 21, where applicable. 'l1lu linear pro-
ll'-t.na model can be solved by the uae of caaputera. The capacity of 
cc:mput•r• ia 1uch that th• mmber of variable• aay not be a ujcn obatacle, 
once probl ... are formulated adequately. 
The Volta River Project ia controlled by the Volta River Authority, 
a atatutory carporation owned by the Republic of Ghana. nie "Authority" 
ia reaponalble far eatabliahina a policy which ainiaize• the total ex-
pected lo•••• to all ue•r• over all future time perioda. The Authority 
wUl, therefore, naturally lib to know the naervoir releu•• per aub-
period p (p, t) and uaer allocatiOJla which ainiai&e the expected total loaa 
to all uera. 
The aolution will apecify the reaervoir releuea and ueer allocation.a 
in all period• t baaed on the beat eatiaate1 available for future net 
inflow• and economic loaaea. Only the current period t'a reaervoir re-
leuu and ~er allocationa are tude, ao that a continual updating of 
the input information and the aolution wtll reault in a cloaer realization 
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of the Volta lliver Authority'• policy objectlve-- that over .. DJ' period• 
the policy will r••ult in an efflct.nt u..e of Lake Volta'• vater re•ourc:a. 
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CHA.PrBR 8. WELFARE CONSIDERATIONS 
Introduction 
Hiaban define• welfare econ011ics aa "that branch of atudy which 
endeavour• to formulate propoaitiona by which we may rank, on the acale 
of better OT worae, alternative economic 1ituatioru1 open to aociety" 
(75, p. 5). The "new" welfare economic• (1939 and after) baa developed 
"elaborate etructuree of thought" attempting to apecify the condition1, 
concepu, and principle• of economic welfare uxtmisation. '111• queation 
aa to whether welfare propoeitiou are capable of being teated hH alway• 
been ubd. The ultimate teat of any theory lie• in it1 ability to 1pecify 
operati~ which, if carried out in the real world, will lead to teat• 
of itt workability (i.e., it• validity). Unl••• .. ana can be found to 
clothe welfare with me .. urable attribute• or to replace it with a mea1ur-
able indicator, the uaefulne11 of welfare maxf.Jli&ation .. a criterion for 
project eelection r ... ina queationable. 
A coalOnly accepted criterion of a aocial change that lead• to in-
cre .. e of economic welfare i• the Pareto criterion, which atatea that 
••a 1ituation in which no individual can be made better off without Ukina 
another WOT•• off" repreaenta an incr•••• of welfare (Abba P. Lerner, 64). 
Becauae of the difficulty of .. aaurement introduced by the iaplicit asauap-
tion of interperaonal coaaparilorui of utility, thil criterion ta uaually 
•tated in a modified fora (the l.aldor-Bick• compenaation teat): velfare ie 
increaaed by a change that re!Mlera it poeaible to aake at leaat one peraon 
better off and leave no individual vorae off by cOlllpenaating the 
117 
* loe•r•. An incr•a• in national income reault 1q from a water reaourc• 
project 18 1afficiently clo1• with the Pareto criterion "with c•penaation"1 
"An incruae of national incOlle may be regarded u a pT&ctieal, fir1t 
appro:daatioa to th• (Pareto 'with compen.aation' criterion), provided that 
the policy under c0111lderation doe8 not appreciably increue inequality 
of incc.e diatribution" (16, p. 307). IncreaH• in national incc.e re· 
aultiq froa increuea in econoaic efficiency can thWI be taken u tndica• 
tori of tncr•a•• in acona11ic welfare if certain reatrictive a11uaptiona 
are accepted and if the re1ulttng dutribution of incOM from th• uae of 
the water reaourcea ia not 1ub1tantially altered toward inequality. 
Equitable Diatribution of the Income of Water U1e 
l'rca the ducuaaion above it follow• that in order to obtain th• mo1t 
enhanc-nt of nation.al tnccaie from the water• of Volta Lake there ii the 
need to apell out ciuite clearly uot only the efficiency conaideratiOIUI 
involved in water reaource allocation &mOQI ua•• but alao the inca.e 
rediltributive conaequancea of 1ucb an allocation. An equitable di1tribu· 
tion of the income or product of water thua need• •OM con.aideration. 
A re1ource 1uch u water can be uted to directly produce vat-
1atiafy1Aa 1ervice1; a1 in hUllAll conaU111ption, recreation and ab1ence of 
f looda. "ObTioua ly, ve want an equitable d ittribution of the•• aervicea: 
•OM people 1bould not die of thlrat vblle othera have water which gou 
* The ccmpenaation principle uk.I only whether loHr• could be coa-
penaateds it doe• not require that they •hould be ca.pen•ated. The de-
clared aia of the c•penaation teat, u laldor (52) atreaau, ii to 
••parata th.a que•tion of "efficiency" froa that of dbtribution. 
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to wa•t•. But Hide froa •uch obviou uample•, an equitable dbtrlbution 
of the beuef ita of water alao l• needed where the product of water t.a aold 
in. the market and generate• income which t.a ued to purchaa• other cona~r 
1ooda (i.e., the water it•elf ta not con.s\alld but it &iT•• riae, throuah 
1 the inc:cme it pneratea, to the opportunity of purchaatna other good•)." 
The water reaource could be devoted to only a fw (•ay, oaa or two) uH; 
•o that the total income from water uae accrue• to the•• fw "firma" 
while other• receive llothing. J'-roa the viewpoint of obtaining th• anateat 
income f-raa the water reaouree, aach a di1tribution. of the product or in· 
came ta undHirable. The eatiefactlon.s derlnd from the lut cedi (or 
dollar) of va.ter•pn.erated income to the per.on receb'ing one a11Uoa 1uch 
cedia would Yery likaly be le•• than for the peraon with only five auch 
cedla. To obtain a large income from water would be quite ineffective if 
thia incoae were not reuonably or equitably dt.atributed. 
B~r, the•• two major condition.a neceHary for the attailaent of 
"met anhanc ... nt of national iru::ome"··the efficiency or allocation pro-
bl• and the income dietributlon probl--.... y not alvaya compleMnt each 
other; ill fact, they quite often interfere with the attaf.nlMlnt of each 
other. Por uaaple, u an attempt at equity in diatrlbution of water 
benetit•, the gayernment may enact a law allowing each per.on in the country 
a certain proportion (aay, 1/7.4 millionth) of the total water aupply. 
A.a Heady and T1-Jna point out, tome of the pereona in the country would 
!urn only unproductive wt•• of the water• the .... water would have a 
1aaady and ti_,n• 43, p. 58. Thia aectlon baa drawn greatly from 
thia •inale page. To avoid frequent footnote reference•, the very utan-
• ive uae which bu been aade of the U.ady-T1-ona paper t.a acknowledged t..re. 
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gTeater marginal value productivity if added to the "uae •hare" of another 
per•on and purpoH, Hence, equity in the diatribution of water would inter-
fere with efficiency in the allocation of water in production. Such a con-
flict between eff lcienc:y in production allocation and equity in diatribution 
can be reaolved in a number of vaye, the moat caaaonly practiced of the•• 
being that via the price mechanina. A price ill aet on water in accordance 
with the auppl7 and productive uaea (deaand). The induatrie• and firru 
would then channel the water into thoae productive uae1 which have the 
hf.&heat marginal value productivitiea in line with conaumeT deaaJ1d1. The 
revenue froa water then could be U1ed to provide general public eervice1 
fo-r people in the country·-thua guaranteeing equity in dbtribution of 
income or other water benefita. If neceaaary, certain prior uae• for 
hullan coneumption, recreation, etc. might have to be firet eetabliabed 
before the price •chaniam 18 applied. From the foregoins ducuaeion and 
illuatrationn, it be~ome• clear that legialation mu.at recognise the income 
(or benefit) dlatribution problem aa well .. the water allocation problea 
if the country'• aupply of water reaource i• to be used moat effectively. 
Welfare Principlaa and Allocation Techniques: ConclU1ion 
Th• difficulty of .. aauring recreation and other intangible benefit• 
in the a.ne way •• other project benefit• auggeate that the coet-benef it 
an.aly•ia uy be ao qualified by the intangible• aa to be of queationable 
value in the deci.ai.on•making proce••· Thia 1.mpliH that water allocation 
deciaiOIUI .. .., need a atronger economic footing than the monetary benefit• 
that could be estimated for any project purpoae. 
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Welfare conaiderationa po•• the queation of how 1atiafied the oppoeing 
potential ua•r• might be made and what price they would be willing to pay 
for recreational or other water uae in order that the project coat could 
be recovered. Thia obvioualy atate• the problem a little differently than 
conventional atudiee, which frequently accept• coat• or price• actually 
paid •• indicators of recreational benefit•, with the reault that benefitl 
can be eaaily undereattmated but not likely to be overeatiaated. In welfare 
economic•, however, J11011etary benefit• and coats play an important but not 
all-important role tn determining the particular allocation of water 8llOlll 
different ueea that would maximize the aatiafaction of the potential uaera. 
The core of e welfare approach to water allocation would be a aerie• 
of utility (indifference) functiona, each ahovf.na the dependence of a 
potential uaert• eatiafaction on variou combination• of all cOlaDditlea 
or Hrvicea he might conaiae, includtna auch aervice• aa recreational uae 
of leisure time. Given the coeta of producing various quantitiee of aoocl• 
and aervicee and coneu.r incomee, it would then be poHible to deteraine 
the quantities of each conaodity or eervice purcbued by each conaumer 
in order to aaxinaue hie level of 1atiafaction, aa well u the 11&rket 
price• paid for eaeh comaodity or service . 
Thea• points all indicate the need for allocation technique• that 
incorporate the objective• of 11DiJaaa aatiafaction. and equitable price 
froa all ueea and for all ueera of water--tn other worda, a goal of making 
all uaera feel aa well off u poHible without ..ting any potential uaer 
feel wor•• off by compenaating the loaera, if neceaaary. It ae ... , then, 
that projects and allocation progr_. leading to "moat euhmcement of 
national income", together with marginal note• on each concerning it. 
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income rediatributive conaequenc••• are operational goal• for water reaou:rce 
project evaluationa. In thu fr11MWork, the allocation technique of Chapter 
7 impUa1 a given incame diatribution. The technique can be repeated for 
varioua incoma dutribution level•, obtainina different ..ximml of nation.al 
incOlllt for each income dbtribution level. The final coordination of 
choice auat be achieved by th• political and adaint•trative deci•lon· 
mald.q proceH; thill evaluation ii done qain8t the bacqrOUDd Of la.a 
uaw.d moral value• of the 1ociety • 1.e. • value j\ldalMnt play• the mo•t 
iaportat role in the final choice. Th• allocation progr_., therefore, 
provide a range of objective, rational •uureMnt• that "will 1harpen 
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